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Abstract
Given a finite set K, we denote by X = ∆(K) the set of probabilities on K and by
Z = ∆f (X) the set of Borel probabilities on X with finite support. Studying a Markov
Decision Process with partial information on K naturally leads to a Markov Decision
Process with full information on X. We introduce a new metric d∗ on Z such that
the transitions become 1-Lipschitz from (X, ‖.‖1) to (Z, d∗). In the first part of the
article, we define and prove several properties of the metric d∗. Especially, d∗ satis-
fies a Kantorovich-Rubinstein type duality formula and can be characterized by using
disintegrations. In the second part, we characterize the limit values in several classes
of “compact non expansive” Markov Decision Processes. In particular we use the me-
tric d∗ to characterize the limit value in Partial Observation MDP with finitely many
states and in Repeated Games with an informed controller with finite sets of states
and actions. Moreover in each case we can prove the existence of a generalized notion
of uniform value where we consider not only the Cesa`ro mean when the number of
stages is large enough but any evaluation function θ ∈ ∆(IN∗) when the impatience
I(θ) =
∑
t≥1 |θt+1 − θt| is small enough.
Keywords : Markov Decision Process, gambling houses, POMDP, Repeated Games,
distance for belief spaces, Kantorovich-Rubinstein duality, limit value, uniform value,
general values, characterization of the value.
1 Introduction
The classic model of Markov Decision Processes with finitely many states,
particular class of the model of Stochastic Games introduced by Shapley (1953),
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was explicitly introduced by Bellman (1957) in the 1950s and has been extensively
studied since then. When the set of actions is also finite, Blackwell (1962) proved
the existence of a strategy which is optimal for all discount factors close to 0.This
model was generalized later to MDPs with Partial Observations (POMDP), (for
references see Araposthatis et al. (1993)). The decision maker observes neither
the state nor his payoff. Instead at each stage, he receives a signal which depends
on the previous state and his previous action. In order to solve this problem a
classic approach is to go back to the classic model of MDPs by introducing an
auxiliary problem with full observation and Borel state space : the space of belief
on the state as shown in Astrom, K.J. (1965), Sawaragi and Yoshikawa (1970)
and Rhenius (1974). For optimality criteria like the Cesa`ro mean and the Abel
mean, these two problems are equivalent and the question of the existence of the
limit value is the same. Then given some sufficient conditions of ergodicity, one
can search for a solution of the Average Cost Optimality Criterion in order to find
“the” value of the MDP, for example as in Runggaldier and Stettner(1991) or as
in Borkar (2000,2007). An introduction to the ACOE in the framework of MDP
and the reduction of POMDP can be found in Herna´ndez-Lerma (1989). From
another point of view, if we know that the limit value exists, the ACOE may be
used as a characterization of the value. For finite MDP, for example, Denardo and
Fox (1968) proved that the limit value is the solution of a linear programming
problem deduced from the ACOE. Moreover by standard linear programming
results, it is also equal to the solution of a dual problem from which Hordjik and
Kallenberg (1979) deduced an optimal strategy. This dual problem focuses on
the maximal payoff that the decision maker can guarantee on invariant measures.
This approach was extended to different criteria (see Kallenberg 1994 ) and to a
convex analytic approach by Borkar ( for references see Borkar 2002) in order to
study problems with a countable state space and a compact action space.
Given an initial POMDP on a finite spaceK, we will follow the usual approach
and introduce a MDP on X = ∆(K) but instead of assuming some ergodicity on
the process we will use the structure of ∆(K) and a new metric on Z = ∆f (∆(K)).
We extend and relax the MDP on ∆f(X) with a uniformly continuous affine payoff
function and non-expansive affine transitions. The structure of Z was already
used in Rosenberg, et al. (2002) and in Renault (2011). Under our new metric,
we highlight a stronger property since the transitions became 1-Lipschitz on Z
and Z is still precompact. We use this property to focus on general evaluations.
Given a probability distribution θ on positive integers, we evaluate a sequence
of payoffs g = (gt)t≥1 by γθ(g) =
∑
t θtgt. In a MDP or a POMDP, the θ-value
is then defined as the maximum expected payoff that the player can guarantee
with this evaluation. Most of the literature focuses on the n-stage game where we
consider the Cesa`ro mean of length n, and on the λ discounted games, where we
consider the Abel mean with parameter λ. The first type of results focuses on the
limit when n converges to +∞ and when λ converges to 0 or the relation between
them. When there is no player, the relation between them is directly linked to a
Hardy-Littlewood theorem (see Filar and Sznajder, 1992). One of the limit exists
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if and only if the other exists and whenever they exist they are equal. Lehrer and
Sorin (1992) proved that this result extends to the case where there is one player
provided we ask for uniform convergence. The other approach focuses on the
existence of a good strategy in any long game or for any discount factor close to
0. We say that the MDP has a uniform value. For MDP with finitely many states,
Blackwell’s result (1962) solved both problems. In POMDPs, Rosenberg, et al.
(2002) proved the existence of the uniform value when the sets of states, actions
and signals are finite, and Renault (2011) removed the finiteness assumption on
signals and actions.
Concerning stochastic games, Mertens and Neyman (1981) proved the exis-
tence of the uniform value when the set of states and the set of actions are finite.
The model also generalizes to partial information but the existence of possible pri-
vate information implies a more complex structure on the auxiliary state space.
Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Mertens (1987) introduced the universal belief
space which synthesizes all the information for both players in a general repeated
game : their beliefs about the state, their beliefs about the beliefs of the other
player, etc... So far, the results always concern some subclasses of games where we
can explicitly write the auxiliary game in a “small” tractable set. A lot of work
has been done on games with one fully informed player and one player with par-
tial information, introduced by Aumann and Maschler (see reference from 1995).
A state is chosen at stage 0 and remains fixed for the rest of the game. Renault
(2006) extended the analysis to a general underlying Markov chain on the state
space (see also Neyman, 2008). Rosenberg et al. (2004) and Renault (2012a) pro-
ved the existence of the uniform value when the informed player can additionally
control the evolution of the state variable.
The first section is dedicated to the description of the (pseudo)-distance d∗ on
∆(X) in the general framework when X is a compact subset of a normed vector
space. We provide different definitions and show that they all define this pseudo-
distance. Then we focus on the case where X is a simplex. We prove that d∗ is a
real metric and prove a “Kantorovich-Rubinstein like ” duality formula for proba-
bilities with finite support on X . We give new definitions and a characterization
by the disintegration mapping. The second section focuses on Gambling Houses
and standard Markov Decision Processes. We first introduce the definitions of
general limit value and general uniform value. Then we give sufficient conditions
for the existence of the general uniform value and a characterization in several
“compact” cases of Gambling Houses and Markov Decision Processes, including
the finite state case. We study the limit value as a linear function of the initial
probability so there are similarities with the convex analytic approach, but we
are able to avoid any assumption on the set of actions. Moreover the MDPs that
we are considering may not have 0-optimal strategies as shown in Renault (2011).
Finally we apply these results to prove the existence of the general uniform value
in finite state POMDPs and repeated games with an informed controller.
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2 A distance for belief spaces
2.1 A pseudo-distance for probabilities on a compact sub-
set of a normed vector space
We fix a compact subset X of a real normed vector space V . We denote by
E = C(X) the set of continuous functions from X to the reals, and by E1 the set
of 1-Lipschitz functions in E. We denote by ∆(X) the set of Borel probability
measures on X , and for each x in X we write δx for the Dirac probability measure
on x. It is well known that ∆(X) is a compact set for the weak-* topology, and
this topology can be metrizable by the (Wasserstein) Kantorovich-Rubinstein
distance :
∀u, v ∈ ∆(X), dKR(u, v) = sup
f∈E1
u(f)− v(f).
We will introduce a pseudo-distance on ∆(X), which is not greater than dKR
and in some cases also metrizes the weak-* topology. We start with several defi-
nitions, which will turn out to be equivalent. Let u and v be in ∆(X).
Definition 2.1.
d1(u, v) = sup
f∈D1
u(f)− v(f),
where D1 = {f ∈ E, ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀a, b ≥ 0, af(x)− bf(y) ≤ ‖ax− by‖}.
Note that any linear functional in V ′ with norm 1 induces an element of D1.
d1 is a pseudo-distance on ∆(X), and d1(u, v) = supf∈D1 |u(f)− v(f)|, since if
f is in D1, −f is also in D1. We also have D1 ⊂ E1, so that d1(u, v) ≤ dKR(u, v)
and the supremum in the definition of d1(u, v) is achieved.
Given x and y in X , there exists a linear functional f in V ′ with norm 1
such that f(y − x) = ‖y − x‖. Then the restriction of f to X is in D1 and
d1(δx, δy) ≥ ‖x− y‖. One can easily deduce that d1(δx, δy) = ‖x− y‖ for x and y
in X .
Example 2.2. Consider the particular case where X = [0, 1] endowed with the
usual norm. Then all f in D1 are linear. As a consequence, d1(u, v) = 0 for
u = 1/2 δ0 + 1/2 δ1 and v = δ1/2. We do not have the separation property and d1
is not a distance in this case.
Let us modify the example. X now is the set of probability distributions
over 2 elements, viewed as X = {(x, 1 − x), x ∈ [0, 1]}. We use the norm ‖.‖1
to measure the distance between (x, 1 − x) and (y, 1 − y), so that V = IR2 is
endowed with ‖(x1, x2) − (y1, y2)‖ = |x1 − y1| + |x2 − y2|. Consider f in E such
that f((x, 1−x)) = x(1−x) for all x. f now belongs to D1, and d1(u, v) ≥ 1/4 > 0
for u = 1/2 δ0 + 1/2 δ1 and v = δ1/2. One can show that (∆(X), d1) is a compact
metric space in this case (see proposition 2.15 later), and for applications in this
paper d1 will be a particularly useful distance whenever X is a simplex ∆(K)
endowed with ‖x− y‖ =
∑
k∈K |x
k − yk|.
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Furthermore it is known that the Kantorovitch Rubinstein metric on ∆(X)
only depends on the restriction of the norm ‖.‖ on the set X . Especially if for all
x, x′ ∈ X such that x 6= x′, ‖x − x′‖ = 2, then for all u, v ∈ ∆(X), dKR(u, v) =
‖u− v‖1. This is not the case when considering the metric d1. Two norms on V
giving the same metric on X may leads to different pseudo-metrics on ∆(X). We
consider in the next example different norms on the Euclidean space IRK .
Example 2.3. We consider V = IRK , X = {e1, .., eK} the set of canonical vec-
tors of V and a norm such that for all k 6= k′, ‖ek − ek′‖ = 2. We know that
d1 is smaller than the Kantorovitch-Rubinstein metric, so for all u ∈ ∆(X) and
v ∈ ∆(X), we have d1(u, v) ≤ ‖u− v‖1.
We first consider the particular case of the norm defined by ‖x−y‖ = 21−
1
p‖x−
y‖p where ‖x− y‖p =
(∑K
k=1 |xk − yk|
p
)1/p
is the usual Lp-norm on IRK , with p
a fixed positive integer. Given u, v ∈ ∆(X), the function f defined by
∀k ∈ K f(k) =
{
1 if u(k) ≥ v(k)
−1 otherwise,
satisfies u(f) − v(f) =
∑
k∈K |u(k) − v(k)| = ‖u − v‖1. Moreover for all a ≥ 0,
b ≥ 0 and k, k′ ∈ K such that k 6= k′, we have
af(k)− bf(k′) ≤ a+ b ≤
2
21/p
(ap + bp)1/p = ‖aek − bek′‖,
and af(k) − bf(k) ≤ |a − b| ≤ |a − b| 2
21/p
. Therefore f is in D1 and d1(u, v) =
‖u− v‖1, independently
1 of p.
Nevertheless the inequality d1(u, v) ≤ ‖u−v‖1 may be strict as in the following
example. We consider the case K = 3 and given a vector (x1, x2, x3) ∈ IR
3, we
define the norm ‖(x1, x2, x3)‖ = max(|x1|+ |x2|, 2|x3|), which satisfies ‖e1−e2‖ =
‖e2− e3‖ = ‖e3− e2‖ = 2. Let f be a function in D1, then we have among others
the following constraints :
∀a, b ≥ 0 af(e3)− bf(e1) ≤ ‖(−b, 0, a)‖ = max(2a, b)
and ∀a ≥ 0 af(e2) ≤ ‖(0, a, 0)‖ = a.
Let u = (0, 1/2, 1/2), v = (1, 0, 0) and f ∈ D1, then
u(f)− v(f) =
1
2
f(e2) +
1
2
f(e3)− f(e1) ≤
1
2
+ max(2/2, 1) =
3
2
.
By symmetry of D1, we deduce that d1(u, v) ≤
3
2
< ‖u−v‖1. In fact one can show
that d1(u, v) =
3
2
by checking that the function defined by f(e1) = 0, f(e2) = 1
and f(e3) = 2 is in D1 and satisfies u(f)− v(f) =
3
2
.
1. Similarly, the same result holds for the case p = +∞, i.e. where ‖x− y‖ = 2‖x− y‖∞.
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We now give other expressions for the pseudo-distance d1.
Definition 2.4.
d2(u, v) = sup
(f,g)∈D2
u(f) + v(g),
where D2 = {(f, g) ∈ E ×E, ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀a, b ≥ 0, af(x) + bg(y) ≤ ‖ax− by‖}.
Definition 2.5.
d+2 (u, v) = inf
ε>0
dε2(u, v), where d
ε
2(u, v) = sup
(f,g)∈Dε2
u(f) + v(g)
and ∀ε > 0, Dε2 = {(f, g) ∈ E×E, ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀a, b ∈ [0, 1], af(x)+bg(y) ≤ ε+‖ax−by‖}.
Definition 2.6.
d3(u, v) = inf
γ∈M3(u,v)
∫
X2×[0,1]2
‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ),
where M3(u, v) is the set of finite positive measures on X
2× [0, 1]2 satisfying for
each f in E :∫
(x,y,λ,µ)∈X2×[0,1]2
λf(x)dγ(x, y, λ, µ) = u(f), and
∫
(x,y,λ,µ)∈X2×[0,1]2
µf(y)dγ(x, y, λ, µ) = v(f).
In the next subsection we will prove the following result.
Theorem 2.7. For all u and v in ∆(X), d1(u, v) = d2(u, v) = d
+
2 (u, v) = d3(u, v).
2.2 Proof of theorem 2.7
The proof is split into several parts.
Proposition 2.8. d1 = d2 = d
+
2 .
It is plain that d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d
+
2 , so all we have to prove is d
+
2 ≤ d1. We start
with a lemma.
Lemma 2.9. Fix ε > 0, and let f in E be such that : ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ [0, 1],
af(x) ≤ ε+ a‖x‖. Define fˆ by :
∀y ∈ X, fˆ(y) = inf
a∈[0,1],b∈(0,1],x∈X
1
b
(ε+ ‖ax− by‖ − af(x)) .
Then for each y in X, −‖y‖ ≤ fˆ(y) ≤ −f(y) + ε. Moreover fˆ ∈ E1, and :
∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ X, ∀a ∈ [0, 1], ∀b ∈ [0, 1], afˆ(x)− bfˆ(y) ≤ aε+ ‖by − ax‖.
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Proof of lemma 2.9 : By assumption on f , we have for all y in X , a in [0, 1], b
in (0, 1], x in X : 1
b
(ε+ ‖ax− by‖ − af(x)) ≥ 1
b
(−a‖x‖ + ‖ax− by‖) ≥ −‖y‖. In
the definition of fˆ(y), considering a = b = 1 and x = y yields fˆ(y) ≤ −f(y) + ε.
Fix x and y in X , a and b in [0, 1]. We have :
afˆ(x)− bfˆ(y) = a inf
a′,b′,x′
1
b′
(ε+ ‖a′x′ − b′x‖ − a′f(x′))
−b inf
a′′,b′′,x′′
1
b′′
(ε+ ‖a′′x′′ − b′′y‖ − a′′f(x′′)) .
If a = 0, then the inequality fˆ(y) ≥ −‖y‖ leads to −bfˆ (y) ≤ b‖y‖. If b = 0,
choose a′ = 0, b′ = 1 and x′ = x to get afˆ(x) ≤ aε+ ‖ax‖.
If ab > 0, given η > 0, choose a′′, b′′, x′′ η-optimal in the second infimum. We
can define x′ = x′′, and choose a′ ∈ [0, 1] and b′ ∈ (0, 1] such that a
′
b′
= b
a
a′′
b′′
. We
obtain :
afˆ(x)− bfˆ(y) ≤ bη + (
a
b′
−
b
b′′
)ε+ (‖
a′′
b′′
bx′′ − ax‖ − ‖
a′′
b′′
bx′′ − by‖)
≤ bη + (
a
b′
−
b
b′′
)ε+ ‖ax− by‖.
If a = b > 0, choose a′ = a′′ and b′ = b′′ to obtain : fˆ(x)− fˆ(y) ≤ ‖x− y‖ and
therefore fˆ is 1-Lipschitz.
Otherwise, we distinguish two cases. If a
b
b′′ ≤ 1, we define b′ = a
b
b′′ and a′ = a′′
and we get afˆ(x) − bfˆ(y) ≤ bη + ‖ax − by‖. If a
b
b′′ > 1, we define b′ = 1 and
a′ = a
′′b
b′′a
∈ [0, 1] and obtain afˆ(x) − bfˆ(y) ≤ bη + aε + ‖ax − by‖. Thus for all
η > 0, we have
afˆ(x)− bfˆ(y) ≤ bη + aε+ ‖ax− by‖,
and therefore afˆ(x)− bfˆ (y) ≤ aε+ ‖ax− by‖. 
Proof of proposition 2.8 : Fix u and v in ∆(X), and consider ε > 0. For each
(f, g) in Dε2, we have −f + ε ≥ fˆ ≥ g and (f, fˆ) in D
ε
2. We also have (fˆ , f) ∈ D
ε
2
so iterating the construction, we get (fˆ ,
ˆˆ
f) ∈ Dε2, and −fˆ + ε ≥
ˆˆ
f ≥ f .
Now, u(f)+v(g) ≤ u(
ˆˆ
f)+v(fˆ) ≤ −u(fˆ)+ε+v(fˆ). Hence we have obtained :
dε2(u, v) ≤ ε+ sup
f∈Cε(u,v)
−u(f) + v(f),
where Cε(u,v) is the set of functions f in E1 satisfying :
∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ X, ∀a ∈ [0, 1], ∀b ∈ [0, 1], af(x)−bf(y) ≤ aε+‖ax−by‖ and f(y) ≥ −‖y‖.
For each positive k, one can choose fk in E1 achieving the above supremum for
ε = 1/k. Taking a limit point of (fk)k yields a function f in D1 such that :
−u(f) + v(f) ≥ d+2 (u, v). The function f
∗ = −f is in D1 and satisfies u(f
∗) −
v(f ∗) ≥ d+2 (u, v), and the proof of proposition 2.8 is complete. 
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Proposition 2.10. d+2 ≥ d3.
Proof : The proof is based on (a corollary of) Hahn-Banach theorem. Define :
H = C(X2 × [0, 1]2) and
L = {ϕ ∈ H, ∃f, g ∈ C(X) s.t. ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀λ, µ ∈ [0, 1], ϕ(x, y, λ, µ) = λf(x)+µg(y)}.
H is endowed with the uniform norm and L is a linear subspace of H . Note that
the unique constant mapping in L is 0. Fix u and v in ∆(X), and let r be the linear
form on L defined by r(ϕ) = u(f) + v(g), where ϕ(x, y, λ, µ) = λf(x) + µg(y) for
all x, y, λ, µ.
Fix now ε > 0, and put :
Uε = {ϕ ∈ H, ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀λ, µ ∈ [0, 1], ϕ(x, y, λ, µ) ≤ ‖λx− µy‖+ ε}.
We have :
sup
ϕ∈L∩Uε
r(ϕ) = dε2(u, v).
Uε is a convex subset of H which is radial at 0, in the sense that : ∀ϕ ∈ H , ∃δ > 0
such that tϕ ∈ Uε as soon as |t| ≤ δ. By a corollary of Hahn-Banach theorem (see
theorem 6.2.11 p.202 in Dudley, 2002), r can be extended to a linear form on H
such that :
sup
ϕ∈Uε
r(ϕ) = dε2(u, v).
Given ϕ ∈ H , we have εϕ/‖ϕ‖∞ ∈ Uε, which implies that r(ϕ) ≤ ‖ϕ‖∞d
ε
2(u, v)/ε,
so that r belongs to H ′. And if ϕ ≥ 0, we have tϕ ∈ Uε if t ≤ 0, so that
r(ϕ) ≥ dε2(u, v)/t for all t ≤ 0 and r(ϕ) ≥ 0. By Riesz Theorem, r can be
represented by a positive finite measure γ on X2 × [0, 1]2.
Given f in E, one can consider ϕf ∈ L defined by ϕf(x, y, λ, µ) = λf(x). r(ϕ =
f) = γ(ϕf) gives : u(f) =
∫
(x,y,λ,µ)∈X2×[0,1]2
λf(x)dγ(x, y, λ, µ), and similarly
v(f) =
∫
(x,y,λ,µ)∈X2×[0,1]2
µf(y)dγ(x, y, λ, µ), and we obtain that γ ∈M3(u, v).
Because γ ≥ 0, supϕ∈Uε r(ϕ) = r(ϕ
∗) where ϕ∗(x, y, λ, µ) = ‖λx − µy‖ + ε.
We get dε2(u, v) =
∫
X2×[0,1]2
‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ) + εγ(X2 × [0, 1]2), so
dε2(u, v) ≥
∫
X2×[0,1]2
‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ) ≥ d3(u, v).

Lemma 2.11. d3 ≥ d2.
Proof : Fix (f, g) ∈ D2 and γ ∈M3(u, v).
u(f) + v(g) =
∫
X2×[0,1]2
λf(x)dγ(x, y, λ, µ) +
∫
X2×[0,1]2
µg(y)dγ(x, y, λ, µ)
=
∫
X2×[0,1]2
(λf(x) + µg(y))dγ(x, y, λ, µ)
≤
∫
X2×[0,1]2
‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ). 
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2.3 The case of probabilities over a simplex
We assume here that X = ∆(K), where K is a non empty finite set. We use
‖p‖ =
∑
k |p
k| for every vector p = (pk)k∈K in IR
K , and view X as the set of
vectors in IRK+ with norm 1.
X = {p = (pk)k∈K ∈ IR
K
+ ,
∑
k∈K
pk = 1}.
Recall that for u and v in ∆(X), we have d1(u, v) = supf∈D1 |u(f)−v(f)|, where
D1 = {f ∈ E, ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀a, b ≥ 0, af(x)− bf(y) ≤ ‖ax− by‖}.
We now introduce an alternative definition of d1 using “non revealing game
functions”. These functions come from the theory of repeated games with incom-
plete information a` la Aumann Maschler (1995), and the interest for the distance
d0 emerged several years ago while doing research on Markov decision processes
with partial observation and repeated games with an informed controller (see
Renault 2011 and 2012a).
Given a collection of matrices (Gk)k∈K (all of the same finite size I × J)
indexed by K and with values in [−1, 1], we define the “non revealing function”
f in C(X) by :
∀p ∈ X, f(p) = Val
(∑
k∈K
pkGk
)
,
= max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
∑
i∈I,j∈J
x(i)y(j)
(∑
k∈K
pkGk(i, j)
)
,
= min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
∑
i∈I,j∈J
x(i)y(j)
(∑
k∈K
pkGk(i, j)
)
.
f(p) is the minmax value of the average matrix
∑
k p
kGk. The set of all such non
revealing functions f , where I, J and (Gk)k∈K vary, is denoted by D0.
Clearly, all affine functions fromX to [−1, 1] belong toD0. It is known that the
set of non revealing functions is dense in C(X). However, we only consider here non
revealing functions defined by matrices with values in [−1, 1], and D0 is not dense
in the set of continuous functions from X to [−1, 1]. As an example, consider the
case where K = {1, 2} and f in E is piecewise-linear with f(1, 0) = f(0, 1) = 0
and f(1/2, 1/2) = 1. If a function g in D0 is such that g(1/2, 1/2) = 1, then
necessarily the values of the two matrix games G1 and G2 are also equal to 1
since it is the maximum value. Therefore f is not in D0. In fact f is 1-Lipschitz,
however 2f(1/2, 1/2)− f(1, 0) = 2 > ‖2(1/2, 1/2)− (1, 0)‖ = 1, so it is not in D1
which we will see later contains D0 (see lemma 2.13).
Lemma 2.12. If f , g belong to D0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], then −f , sup{f, g}, inf{f, g}
and λf + (1− λ)g are in D0. The linear span of D0 is dense in C(X).
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Proof : The proof can be easily deduced from proposition 5.1. page 357 in MSZ,
part B. For instance, let f and g in D0 be respectively defined by the collections
of matrices (Gk)k∈K with size I1 × J1 and (H
k)k∈K with size I2 × J2.
Defining for each k, i1, j1 : G
′k(i1, j1) = −G
k(j1, i1) yields a family of matrices
(G′k)k with size J1 × I1 inducing −f . So −f ∈ D0.
To get that sup{f, g} belongs to D0, one can assume w.l.o.g. that I1 ∩ I2 =
J1 ∩ J2 = ∅. Set I = I1 ∪ I2 and J = J1 × J2. Define for each k the matrix
game Lk in IRI×J by Lk(i, (j1, j2)) = G
k(i, j1) if i ∈ I1, L
k(i, (j1, j2)) = H
k(i, j2)
if i ∈ I2. Then for each p in X , we have Val(
∑
k p
kLk) = sup{f(p), g(p)}, so that
sup{f, g} ∈ D0.
Lemma 2.13. The closure of D0 is D1.
Proof : We first show that D0 ⊂ D1. Let I and J be finite sets, and (G
k)k∈K be
a collection of I × J-matrices with values in [−1, 1]. Consider p and q in X and
a and b non negative. Then for all i and j :∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
pkaGk(i, j)−
∑
k
qkbGk(i, j)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤∑
k
|apk − bqk| = ‖ap− bq‖.
As a consequence,
aVal
(∑
k∈K
pkGk
)
− bVal
(∑
k∈K
qkGk
)
= Val
(∑
k∈K
apkGk
)
− Val
(∑
k∈K
bqkGk
)
≤ ‖ap− bq‖
We now show that the closure of D0 is D1. Consider f in D1, in particular we
have ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1. Let p and q be distinct elements in X , and define Y as the linear
span of p and q, and define ϕ from Y to IR such that : ϕ(λp+µq) = λf(p)+µf(q)
for all reals λ and µ.
If λ ≥ 0 and µ ≥ 0, we have ϕ(λp + µq) ≤ λ + µ = ‖λp + µq‖. If λ ≥ 0
and µ ≤ 0, we directly use the definition of D1 to get : ϕ(λp+ µq) ≤ ‖λp+ µq‖.
As a consequence, ϕ is a linear form with norm at most 1 on Y . By Hahn-
Banach theorem, it can be extended to a linear mapping on IRK with the same
norm, and we denote by g the restriction of this mapping to X . g is affine with
g(p) = ϕ(p) = f(p) and g(q) = ϕ(q) = f(q). Moreover, for each r in X , we have
‖g(r)‖ ≤ ‖r‖ = 1. As a consequence g belongs to D0.
Because D0 is stable under the sup and inf operations, we can use Stone-
Weierstrass theorem (see for instance lemma A7.2 in Ash p.392) to conclude that
f belongs to the closure of D0. 
Definition 2.14. Given u and v in ∆(X), define :
d0(u, v) = sup
f∈D0
u(f)− v(f)
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Proposition 2.15. d0 is a distance on ∆(X) metrizing the weak-* topology.
Moreover d0 = d1 = d2 = d3.
Proof : d0 = d1 = d2 = d3 follows from lemma 2.13 and theorem 2.7. Because
the linear span of D0 is dense in C(X), we obtain the separation property and
d0 is a distance on ∆(X). Because D0 ⊂ D1 ⊂ E1, we have d0 = d1 ≤ dKR.
Since (∆(X), dKR) is a compact metric space, the identity map (∆(X), dKR) to
(∆(X), d0) is bicontinuous, and we obtain that (∆(X), d0) is a compact metric
space and d0 and dKR are equivalent. (see for instance proposition 2 page 138
Aubin). 
Remark : one can show that allowing for infinite sets I, J in the definition of
D0 (still assuming that all games
∑
k p
kGk have a value) would not change the
value of d0.
From now on, we just write d∗(u, v) for the distance d0 = d1 = d2 = d3 on
∆(X). Elements of X can be viewed as elements of ∆(X) (using Dirac measures),
and it is well known that for p, q in X , we have : dKR(δp, δq) = ‖p− q‖. We have
the same result with d∗.
Lemma 2.16. For p, q in X, we have d∗(δp, δq) = ‖p− q‖.
Proof : Define K1 = {k ∈ K, p
k ≥ qk}, and K2 = K\K1. Consider f affine on
X such that f(k) = +1 if k ∈ K1, and f(k) = −1 if k ∈ K2. Then f ∈ D1, and
d∗(δp, δq) ≥ |f(p)− f(q)| = ‖p− q‖. The other inequality is clear. 
We now present a dual formulation for our distance, in the spirit of Kantoro-
vich duality formula from optimal transport. For any u, v in ∆(X), we denote by
Π(u, v) the set of transference plans, or couplings, of u and v, that is the set of
probability distributions over X ×X with first marginal u and second marginal
v. Recall (see for instance Villani 2003, p.207) :
dKR(u, v) = sup
f∈E1
|u(f)− v(f)| = min
γ∈Π(u,v)
∫
(x,y)∈X×X
‖x− y‖ dγ(x, y)
We will concentrate on probabilities on X with finite support. We denote by
Z = ∆f(X) the set of such probabilities.
Definition 2.17. Let u and v be in Z with respective supports U and V . We
define M4(u, v) as the set{
(α, β) ∈ (IR+
U×V )2, s.t.∀x ∈ U, ∀y ∈ V,
∑
y′∈V
α(x, y′) = u(x) and
∑
x′∈U
β(x′, y) = v(y)
}
.
And d4(u, v) = inf
(α,β)∈M4(u,v)
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
‖xα(x, y)− yβ(x, y)‖
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Notice that diagonal elements inM4(u, v), i.e. measures α such that (α, α) ∈
M4(u, v), coincide with elements of Π(u, v).M4(u, v) is a polytope in the Eucli-
dean space (IRU×V )2, so the infimum in the definition of d4(u, v) is achieved.
Theorem 2.18. (Duality formula) Let u and v be in Z with respective supports
U and V .
d∗(u, v) = sup
f∈D1
|u(f)− v(f)| = min
(α,β)∈M4(u,v)
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
‖xα(x, y)− yβ(x, y)‖
where D1 = {f ∈ E, ∀x, y ∈ X, ∀a, b ≥ 0, af(x)− bf(y) ≤ ‖ax− by‖},
and M4(u, v) =
{
(α, β) ∈ IR+
U×V × IR+
U×V , s.t. ∀(x, y) ∈ U × V,∑
y′∈V α(x, y
′) = u(x) and
∑
x′∈U β(x
′, y) = v(y)
}
.
The proof is postponed to the next subsection. We conclude this part by a
simple but fundamental property of the distance d∗.
Definition 2.19. Given a finite set S, we define the posterior mapping ψS from
∆(K × S) to ∆(X) by :
ψS(π) =
∑
s∈S
π(s)δp(s)
where for each s, π(s) =
∑
k π(k, s) and p(s) = (p
k(s))k∈K ∈ X is the posterior
on K given s (defined arbitrarily if π(s) = 0) : for each k in K, pk(s) = π(k,s)
π(s)
.
ψS(π) is a probability with finite support over X . Intuitively, think of a joint
variable (k, s) being selected according to π, and an agent just observes s. His
knowledge on K is then represented by p(s). And ψS(π) represents the ex-ante
information that the agent will know about the variable k. ∆(K ×S) is endowed
as usual with the ‖.‖1 norm. One can show that ψS is continuous whenever X is
endowed with the weak-* topology. Intuitively, ψS(π) has less information than
π, because the agent does not care about s itself but just on the information
about k given by s. So one may hope that the mapping ψS is 1-Lipschitz (non
expansive) for a well chosen distance on ∆(X). This is not the case if one uses
the Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance dKR, as shown by the example below :
Example 2.20. Consider the case where K = {a, b, c} and S = {α, β}. We
denote by π and π′ the following laws on ∆(K × S) :
S S
K
14 00 1
2
1
4
0
 and
14 00 1
2
0 1
4
.
π π′
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Their disintegrations are respectively ψS(π) =
1
2
120
1
2
 + 1
2
01
0
 and ψS(π′) =
1
4
10
0
 + 3
4
02
3
1
3
 . We define the test function f : ∆(K)→ [−1, 1] by
f
01
0
 = 1
3
, f
120
1
2
 = −1
3
,
f
02
3
1
3
 = 1 and f
10
0
 = 2
3
.
We have ‖π−π′‖ = 1
2
and since f is 1-Lipschitz, dKR(ψS(π), ψS(π
′)) ≥ ψS(π
′)(f)−
ψS(π)(f) =
11
12
− 0 > 1
2
. The posterior mapping ψS is not 1-Lipschitz from
(∆(K × S), ‖.‖1) to (∆(X), dKR) .
However, the next proposition shows that the distance d∗ has the desirable
property.
Proposition 2.21. For each finite set S, the mapping ψS is 1-Lipschitz from
(∆(K × S), ‖.‖1) to (∆f (X), d∗).
Moreover, d∗ is the largest distance on Z having this property : given u and v
in Z, we have
d∗(u, v) = inf{‖π − π
′‖1, s.t. S finite, ψS(π) = u, ψS(π
′) = v}.
Proof : First fix S and π, π′ in ∆(K × S). Write u = ψS(π), u
′ = ψS(π
′). For
any f in D1, we have :
u(f)− u′(f) =
∑
s∈S
(π(s)f(p(s))− π′(s)f(p′(s))
≤
∑
s∈S
‖π(s)p(s)− π′(s)p′(s)‖
≤
∑
s∈S
‖(π(k, s))k − (π
′(k, s))k‖
≤
∑
s∈S
∑
k∈K
|π(k, s)− π′(k, s)| = ‖π − π′‖1.
So d∗(u, u
′) ≤ ‖π − π′‖1, and ψS is 1-Lipschitz.
Let now u and v be in Z. There exists (α, β) ∈M4(u, v) such that
d∗(u, v) =
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
‖α(x, y)x− β(x, y)y‖.
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Define S = U × V and π, π′ ∈ ∆(K × S) by π(k, (x, y)) = x(k)α(x, y) and
π′(k, (x, y)) = y(k)β(x, y). By definition of M4(u, v), π and π
′ are probabilities
and
‖π − π′‖1,K×S =
∑
k∈K,(x,y)∈U×V
|x(k)α(x, y)− y(k)β(x, y)|
=
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
‖α(x, y)x− β(x, y)y‖.

2.4 Proof of the duality formula
Let u and v be in ∆(X), and denote by U and V the respective supports of u
and v. We write S = X2× [0, 1]2, and we start with a lemma, where no finiteness
assumption on U or V is needed.
Lemma 2.22. For each γ ∈M3(u, v), we have :∫
X2×[0,1]2
‖λx−µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ) = 2+
∫
U×V×[0,1]2
(‖λx− µy‖ − λ− µ) dγ(x, y, λ, µ).
Proof : Write A(γ) =
∫
S
‖λx − µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ). By definition of M3(u, v), we
have : ∫
S
λ1x/∈Udγ = 0, and
∫
S
µ1y/∈V dγ = 0.
So that λ1x/∈U = µ1y/∈V = 0 γ. a.e. We can write :
A(γ) =
∫
S
1x∈U,y∈V ‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ) +
∫
S
1x∈U,y/∈V ‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ)
+
∫
S
1x/∈U,y∈V ‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ) +
∫
S
1x/∈U,y/∈V ‖λx− µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ)
=
∫
S
1x∈U,y∈V ‖λx−µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ)+
∫
S
1x∈U,y/∈V λdγ(x, y, λ, µ)+
∫
S
1x/∈U,y∈V µdγ(x, y, λ, µ)+0.
We also have by definition of M3(u, v) that 1 =
∫
S
1x∈Uλdγ, so that :
1 =
∫
S
1x∈U,y∈V λdγ +
∫
S
1x∈U,y/∈V λdγ.
And similarly 1 =
∫
S
1x∈U,y∈V µdγ +
∫
S
1x/∈U,y∈V µdγ. We obtain :
A(γ) = 2+
∫
S
1x∈U,y∈V ‖λx−µy‖dγ(x, y, λ, µ)−
∫
S
1x∈U,y∈V λdγ−
∫
S
1x∈U,y∈V µdγ.

We assume in the sequel that U and V are finite, and define d5(u, v) as follows :
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Definition 2.23. Define
M5(u, v) =
{
(α, β) = (α(x, y), β(x, y))(x,y)∈U×V ∈ (IR
U×V )2, s.t.∀x ∈ U, ∀y ∈ V,
α(x, y) ≥ 0, β(x, y) ≥ 0,
∑
y′∈V
α(x, y′) ≤ u(x) and
∑
x′∈U
β(x′, y) ≤ v(y)
}
.
And d5(u, v) = inf
(α,β)∈M5(u,v)
2+
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
(‖xα(x, y)− yβ(x, y)‖ − α(x, y)− β(x, y)) .
M5(u, v) is a polytope in the Euclidean space (IR
U×V )2, so the infimum in
the definition of d5(u, v) is achieved.
Lemma 2.24. d3(u, v) ≥ d5(u, v).
Proof : Let γ be in M3(u, v). Fix for a while (x, y) in U × V , and assume that
γ(x, y) > 0. We define γ(.|x, y) the conditional probability on [0, 1]2 given (x, y)
by : for all ϕ ∈ C([0, 1]2),∫
[0,1]2
ϕ(λ, µ)dγ(λ, µ|x, y) =
1
γ(x, y)
∫
(x′,y′,λ,µ)∈S
1x′=x,y′=yϕ(λ, µ)dγ(x
′, y′, λ, µ).
So that
γ(x, y)
∫
[0,1]2
(‖λx−µy‖−λ−µ)dγ(λ, µ|x, y) =
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
(‖λx−µy‖−λ−µ)dγ(x, y, λ, µ).
The mapping Ψ : (λ, µ) 7→ ‖λx−µy‖−λ−µ is convex so by Jensen’s inequality
we get : ∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
(‖λx− µy‖ − λ− µ)dγ(λ, µ|x, y) ≥
‖x
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
λdγ(λ, µ|x, y)− y
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
µdγ(λ, µ|x, y)‖
−
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
λdγ(λ, µ|x, y)−
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
µdγ(λ, µ|x, y).
We write :
P (x, y) =
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
λdγ(λ, µ|x, y) and Q(x, y) =
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
µdγ(λ, µ|x, y),
so that∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
(‖λx−µy‖−λ−µ)dγ(λ, µ|x, y) ≥ ‖xP (x, y)−yQ(x, y)‖−P (x, y)−Q(x, y).
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Now, by lemma 2.22
A(γ) = 2 +
∑
x∈U,y∈V
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
(‖λx− µy‖ − λ− µ) dγ(x, y, λ, µ)
= 2 +
∑
x∈U,y∈V,γ(x,y)>0
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
(‖λx− µy‖ − λ− µ) dγ(x, y, λ, µ)
≥ 2 +
∑
x∈U,y∈V,γ(x,y)>0
γ(x, y) (‖xP (x, y)− yQ(x, y)‖ − P (x, y)−Q(x, y)) .
For (x, y) in U × V , define α(x, y) = γ(x, y)P (x, y) ≥ 0 and β(x, y) =
γ(x, y)Q(x, y) ≥ 0 (with α(x, y) = β(x, y) = 0 if γ(x, y) = 0). We get :
A(γ) ≥ 2 +
∑
x∈U,y∈V
(‖xα(x, y)− yβ(x, y)‖ − α(x, y)− β(x, y)) .
And we have, for each x in U :∑
y∈V
α(x, y) =
∑
y∈V,γ(x,y)>0
∫
(λ,µ)∈[0,1]2
λdγ(x, y, λ, µ)
≤
∫
(y,λ,µ)∈X×[0,1]2
λdγ(x, y, λ, µ) = u(x).
where the last equality comes from the definition ofM3(u, v). Similarly, for each
y in V we can show that
∑
x∈U β(x, y) ≤ v(y), and lemma 2.24 is proved. 
Lemma 2.25. d5(u, v) ≥ d4(u, v).
Proof : Consider (α∗, β∗) achieving the minimum in the definition of d5(u, v).
Assume that there exists x∗ such that
∑
y∈V α(x
∗, y) < u(x∗). For any x in X and
z in IRK+ , one can check that the mapping l : (α 7→ ‖xα−z‖−α) is nonincreasing
from IR+ to IR (as the sum of the mappings lk : (α 7→ |αx
k − zk| − αxk), each
lk being non increasing in α). As a consequence, one can choose any y∗ in V
and increase α(x∗, y∗) in order to saturate the constraint without increasing the
objective. So we can assume without loss of generality that
∑
y∈V α(x
∗, y) = u(x∗)
for all x∗ and similarly
∑
x∈U β(x, y
∗) = v(y∗) for all y∗.
Consequently,
d5(u, v) = 2 +
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
(‖xα∗(x, y)− yβ∗(x, y)‖ − α∗(x, y)− β∗(x, y))
=
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
‖xα∗(x, y)− yβ∗(x, y)‖ ≥ d4(u, v).
Lemma 2.26. d4(u, v) ≥ d2(u, v).
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Proof : Fix (f, g) ∈ D2 and (α, β) ∈M4(u, v).
u(f) + v(g) =
∑
x∈U
f(x)u(x) +
∑
y∈Y
g(y)v(y)
=
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
f(x)α(x, y) + g(y)β(x, y)
≤
∑
(x,y)∈U×V
‖α(x, y)x− β(x, y)y‖ ≤ d4(u, v).
We have shown that d3(u, v) ≥ d5(u, v) ≥ d4(u, v) ≥ d2(u, v) = d3(u, v) =
d1(u, v). This ends the proof of theorem 2.18.
3 Long-term values for compact non expansive
Markov Decision Processes
In this section we consider Markov Decision Processes, or Controlled Markov
Chains, with bounded payoffs and transitions with finite support. We will consider
two closely related models of MDP and prove in each case the existence and a
characterization for a general notion of long-term value. The first model deals
with MDP without any explicit action set (hence, payoffs only depend on the
current state), such MDP will be called gambling houses using the terminology of
gambling theory (see Maitra and Sudderth 1996). We will assume in this setup
that the set of states X is metric compact and that the transitions are non
expansive with respect to the KR-distance on ∆(X). Since we only use the KR-
distance here, the theorem for the first model, namely theorem 3.9, does not
use the distance for belief spaces studied in section 2. The second model is the
standard model of Markov Decision Processes with states, actions, transitions and
payoffs, and we will assume that the state spaceX is a compact subset of a simplex
∆(K). We will need for this second case an assumption of non expansiveness for
the transitions which is closely related to the distance d∗ introduced in section 2,
see theorem 3.19 later. The applications in sections 4.1 and 4.2 will be based on
the second model.
3.1 Long-term values for Gambling Houses
In this section we consider Markov Decision Processes of the following form.
There is a non empty set of statesX , a transition given by a multi-valued mapping
F : X ⇒ ∆f (X) with non empty values, and a payoff (or reward) function
r : X → [0, 1]. The idea is that given an initial state x0 in X , a decision-maker
(or player) can choose a probability with finite support u1 in F (x0), then x1 is
selected according to u1 and there is a payoff r(x1). Then the player has to select
u2 in F (x1), x2 is selected according to u1 and the player receives the payoff r(x2),
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etc... Note that there is no explicit action set here, and that the transitions take
values in ∆f (X) and hence all have finite support.
We say that Γ = (X,F, r) is a Gambling House. We assimilate the elements in
X with their Dirac measures in ∆(X), and in case the values of F only consist of
Dirac measures on X , we view F as a correspondence from X to X and say that
Γ is a deterministic Gambling House (or a Dynamic Programming problem). In
general we write Z = ∆f (X), and an element in Z is written u =
∑
x∈X u(x)δx.
The set of stages is IN∗ = {1, ..., t, ....}, and a probability distribution over stages
is called an evaluation. Given an evaluation θ = (θt)t≥1 and an initial stage x0
in X , the θ-problem Γθ(x0) is the problem induced by a decision-maker starting
from x0 and maximizing the expectation of
∑
t≥1 θtr(xt).
Formally, we first linearly extend r and F to ∆f (X) by defining for each
u =
∑
x∈X u(x)δx in Z, the payoff r(u) =
∑
x∈X r(x)u(x) and the transition
F (u) = {
∑
x∈X u(x)f(x), s.t. f : X → Z and f(x) ∈ F (x)∀x ∈ X}. We also
define the mixed extension of F as the correspondence from Z to itself which
associates to every u =
∑
x∈X u(x)δx in ∆f (X) the image :
Fˆ (u) =
{∑
x∈X
u(x)f(x), s.t. f : X → Z and f(x) ∈ convF (x) ∀x ∈ X
}
.
The graph of Fˆ is the convex hull of the graph of F . Moreover Fˆ is an affine
correspondence, as shown by the lemma below.
Lemma 3.1. ∀u, u′ ∈ Z, ∀α ∈ [0, 1], Fˆ (αu+ (1−α)u′) = αFˆ (u) + (1−α)Fˆ (u′).
Proof : The⊂ part is clear. To see the reverse inclusion, let v = α
∑
x∈X u(x)f(x)+
(1−α)
∑
x∈X u
′(x)f ′(x) be in αFˆ (u) + (1−α)Fˆ (u′), with transparent notations.
Define
g(x) =
αu(x)f(x) + (1− α)u′(x)f ′(x)
αu(x) + (1− α)u′(x)
,
for each x such that the denominator is positive. Then g(x) ∈ convF (x), and
v =
∑
x∈X
(αu(x) + (1− α)u′(x))g(x) ∈ Fˆ (αu+ (1− α)u′).
Definition 3.2. A pure play, or deterministic play, at x0 is a sequence σ =
(u1, ..., ut, ...) ∈ Z
∞ such that u1 ∈ F (x0) and ut+1 ∈ F (ut) for each t ≥ 1.
A play, or mixed play, at x0 is a sequence σ = (u1, ..., ut, ...) ∈ Z
∞ such that
u1 ∈ convF (x0) and ut+1 ∈ Fˆ (ut) for each t ≥ 1. We denote by Σ(x0) the set of
mixed plays at x0.
A pure play is a particular case of a mixed play. Mixed plays corresponds to
situations where the decision-maker can select, at every stage t and state xt−1,
randomly the law ut of the new state. A mixed play at x0 naturally induces a pro-
bability distribution over the set (X ×∆f(X))
∞ of sequences (x0, u0, x1, u1, ...),
where X and Z are endowed with the discrete σ-algebra and (X ×∆f (X))
∞ is
endowed with the product σ-algebra.
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Definition 3.3. Given an evaluation θ, the θ-payoff of a play σ = (u1, ..., ut, ...)
is defined as : γθ(σ) =
∑
t≥1 θtr(ut), and the θ-value at x0 is :
vθ(x0) = sup
σ∈Σ(x0)
γθ(σ).
It is easy to see that the supremum in the definition of vθ can be taken over the set
of pure plays at x0. We have the following recursive formula. For each evaluation
θ = (θt)t≥1 such that θ1 < 1, we denote by θ
+ the “shifted” evaluation ( θt+1
1−θ1
)t≥1.
We extend linearly vθ to Z, so that the recursive formula can be written :
∀θ ∈ ∆(IN∗), ∀x ∈ X, vθ(x) = sup
u∈convF (x)
(θ1r(u) + (1− θ1)vθ+(u)) .
And by linearity the supremum can be taken over F (x). It is also easy to see that
for all evaluation θ and initial state x, we have the inequality :
|vθ(x)− sup
u∈F (x)
vθ(u)| ≤ θ1 +
∑
t≥2
|θt − θt−1|. (1)
In this paper, we are interested in the limit behavior when the decision-maker
is very patient. Given an evaluation θ, we define :
I(θ) =
∑
t≥1
|θt+1 − θt|
The decision-maker is considered as patient whenever I(θ) is small, so I(θ) may
be seen as the impatience of θ (see Sorin, 2002 p. 105 and Renault 2012b). When
θ = (θt)t≥1 is non increasing, then I(θ) is just θ1. A classic example is when
θ =
∑n
t=1
1
n
δt, the value vθ is just denoted vn and the evaluation corresponds to
the average payoff from stage 1 to stage n. In this case I(θ) = 1/n −→n→∞ 0.
We also have I(θ) = 1/n if θ =
∑m+n
t=m
1
n
δt for some non-negative m. Another
example is the case of discounted payoffs, when θ = (λ(1− λ)t−1)t≥1 for some
discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1], and in this case I(θ) = λ −→λ→0 0.
Definition 3.4. The Gambling House Γ = (X,F, r) has a general limit value v∗
if (vθ) uniformly converges to v
∗ when I(θ) goes to zero, i.e. :
∀ε > 0, ∃α > 0, ∀θ, ( I(θ) ≤ α =⇒ (∀x ∈ X, |vθ(x)− v
∗(x)| ≤ ε) ) .
The existence of the general limit value implies in particular that (vn)n and (vλ)λ
converge to the same limit when n goes to +∞ and λ goes to 0. This is co-
herent with the result of Lehrer and Sorin (1992), which states that the uniform
convergence of (vn)n and (vλ)λ are equivalent.
In the definition of the general limit value, we require all value functions to
be close to v∗ when the patience is high, but the plays used may depend on the
precise expression of θ. In the following definition, we require the same play to
be simultaneously optimal for all θ patient enough.
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Definition 3.5. The Gambling House Γ = (X,F, r) has a general uniform value
if it has a general limit value v∗ and moreover for each ε > 0 one can find α > 0
and for each initial state x a mixed play σ(x) at x satisfying :
∀θ, (I(θ) ≤ α =⇒ (∀x ∈ X, γθ(σ(x)) ≥ v
∗(x)− ε) ) .
Up to now, the literature in repeated games has focused on the evaluations
θ =
∑n
t=1
1
n
δt and θ = (λ(1− λ)
t−1)t≥1. The standard (Cesa`ro)-uniform value can
be defined by restricting the evaluations to be Cesa`ro means : for each ε > 0
one can find n0 and for each initial state x a mixed play σ(x) at x satisfying :
∀n ≥ n0, ∀x ∈ X, γn(σ(x)) ≥ v
∗(x)− ε. Recently, Renault (2011) considered de-
terministic Gambling Houses and characterized the uniform convergence of the
value functions (vn)n. He also proved the existence of the standard Cesa`ro-uniform
value under some assumptions, including the case where the set of states X is
metric precompact, the transitions are non expansive and the payoff function is
uniformly continuous. As a corollary, he proved the existence of the uniform value
in Partial Observation Markov Decision Processes with finite set of states (after
each stage the decision-maker just observes a stochastic signal more or less cor-
related to the new state).
We now present our main theorem for Gambling Houses. Equation (1) implies
that the general limit value v∗ necessarily has to satisfy some rigidity property.
The function v∗ (or more precisely its linear extension to Z) can only be an
“excessive function” in the terminology of potential theory (Choquet 1956) and
gambling houses (Dubins and Savage 1965, Maitra and Sudderth 1996).
Definition 3.6. An affine function w defined on Z (or ∆(X)) is said to be
excessive if for all x in X, w(x) ≥ supu∈F (x)w(u).
Example 3.7. Let us consider the splitting transition given by K a finite set,
X = ∆(K) and ∀x ∈ X,F (x) = {u ∈ ∆(X),
∑
p∈X u(p)p = x}. Then the
function w from Z = ∆(X) to [0, 1] is excessive if and only if the restriction of
w to X is concave. Moreover given u, u′ ∈ ∆(X), u′ ∈ Fˆ (u) if and only u′ is the
sweeping of u as defined by Choquet (1956) : for all continuous concave functions
f from X to [0, 1], u′(f) ≤ u(f).
Assume now that X is a compact metric space and r is continuous. r is natu-
rally extended to an affine continuous function on ∆(X) by r(u) =
∫
p∈X
r(p)du(p)
for all Borel probabilities on X . In the following definition, we consider the closure
of the graph of Fˆ within the (compact) set ∆(X ×X).
Definition 3.8. An element u in ∆(X) is said to be an invariant measure of
the Gambling House Γ = (X,F, r) if (u, u) ∈ cl(Graph Fˆ ). The set of invariant
measures of Γ is denoted by R, so that :
R = {u ∈ ∆(X), (u, u) ∈ cl(Graph Fˆ )}.
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R is a convex compact subset of ∆(X). Recall that for u and u′ in ∆(X), the
Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance between u and u′ is denoted by dKR(u, u
′) =
supf∈E1 |u(f)− u
′f)|.
Theorem 3.9. Consider a Gambling House Γ = (X,F, r) such that X is a
compact metric space, r is continuous and F is non expansive with respect to the
KR distance :
∀x ∈ X, ∀x′ ∈ X, ∀u ∈ F (x), ∃u′ ∈ F (x′)s.t. dKR(u, u
′) ≤ d(x, x′).
Then the Gambling House has a general uniform value v∗ characterized by :
∀x ∈ X, v∗(x) = inf
{
w(x), w : ∆(X)→ [0, 1] affine C0 s.t.
(1) ∀y ∈ X,w(y) ≥ sup
u∈F (y)
w(u) and (2)∀u ∈ R,w(u) ≥ r(u)
}
.
That is, v∗ is the smallest continuous affine function on X which is 1) excessive
and 2) above the running payoff r on invariant measures.
Notice that :
1) when Γ = (X,F, r) is deterministic, the hypotheses are satisfied as soon as
X is metric compact for some metric d, r is continuous and F is non expansive
for d.
2) when X is finite, one can use the distance d(x, x′) = 2 for all x 6= x′ in X ,
so that for u and u′ in ∆(X), dKR(u, u
′) = ‖u− u′‖1 =
∑
x∈X |u(x)− u
′(x)|, and
the hypotheses are automatically satisfied. We will prove later a more general
result for a model of MDP with finite state space, allowing for explicit actions
influencing transitions and payoffs (see corollary 3.20).
Remark 3.10. The formula also holds when there is no decision maker, i.e. when
F is single-valued, and there are some similarities with the Von Neumann ergodic
theorem (1932). Let Z be a Hilbert space and Q be a linear isometry on Z, this
theorem states that for all z ∈ Z, the sequence zn =
1
n
∑n
t=1Q
t(z) converges to
the projection z∗ of z on the set R of fixed points of Q. Using the linearity and
the non expansiveness leads to a characterization by the set of fixed points. In
particular, having in mind linear payoff functions of the form (z 7→< l, z >), we
have that the projection z∗ of z on R is characterized by :
∀l ∈ Z,< l, z∗ >=< l∗, z >= inf{< l′, z >, l′ ∈ R and < l′, r >≥< l, r > ∀r ∈ R}.
Example 3.11. We consider here a basic periodic sequence of 0 and 1. Let
X = {0, 1} and for all x ∈ X , F (x) = {1 − x} and r(x) = x. There is a unique
invariant measure u = 1/2δ0 + 1/2δ1, and the general uniform value exists and
satisifes v∗(x) = 1
2
for all states x. Notice that considering evaluations θ = (θt)t
such that θt is small for each t without requiring I(θ) small, would not necessarily
lead to v∗. Consider for instance θn =
∑n
t=1
1
n
δ2t for each n, we have vθn(x) = x
for all x in X .
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Example 3.12. The state space is the unit circle, let X = {x ∈ C, |x| = 1}
and F (eiα) = ei(α+1) for all real α. If we denote by µ the uniform distribution
(Haar probability measure) on the circle, the mapping F is µ-ergodic and µ is F -
invariant. By Birkhoff’s theorem (1931), we know that the time average converges
to the space average µ-almost surely. Here µ is the unique invariant measure, and
we obtain that the general uniform value is the constant :
∀x ∈ X, v∗(x) =
1
2π
∫ 2π
0
r(eiα)dα.
Notice that the value vθ(x) converges to v
∗(x) for all x in X , and not only for
µ-almost all x in X .
Example 3.13. Let Γ = (X,F, r) be a MDP satisfying the hypotheses of the
theorem 3.9 such that for all x ∈ X , δx ∈ F (x). Therefore the set R is equal to
∆(X). In the terminology of Gambling Theory (see Maitra Sudderth, 1996), Γ
is called a leavable gambling house since at each stage the player can stay at the
current state. The limit value v∗ is here characterized by :
v∗ = inf{v : X → [0, 1] C0, v is excessive and v ≥ r}.
In the above formula, v excessive means : ∀x ∈ X, v(x) ≥ supu∈F (x) IEu(v). This
is a variant of the fundamental theorem of gambling theory (see section 3.1 in
Maitra Sudderth 1996).
Example 3.14. The following deterministic Gambling House, which is an ex-
tension of example 1.4.4. in Sorin (2002) and of example 5.2 of Renault (2011),
shows that the assumptions of theorem 3.9 allow for many speeds of conver-
gence to the limit value v∗. Here l > 1 is a fixed parameter, X is the simplex
{x = (pa, pb, pc) ∈ IR3+, p
a+ pb+ pc = 1} and the initial state is x0 = (1, 0, 0). The
payoff is r(pa, pb, pc) = pb − pc, and the transition is defined by : F (pa, pb, pc) =
{((1− α− αl)pa, pb + αpa, pc + αlpa), α ∈ [0, 1/2]}.
The probabilistic interpretation is the following : there are 3 points a, b and
c, and the initial point is a. The payoff is 0 at a, it is +1 at b, and -1 at c. At
point a, the decision maker has to choose α ∈ [0, 1/2] : then b is reached with
probability α, c is reached with probability αl, and the play stays in a with the
remaining probability 1−α−αl. When b (resp. c) is reached, the play stays at b
(resp. c) forever. So the decision maker starting at point a wants to reach b and
to avoid c. By playing at each stage α > 0 small enough, he can get as close to b
as he wants.
Back to our deterministic setup, we use norm ‖.‖1 and obtain that X is com-
pact, F is non expansive and r is continuous, so that theorem 3.9 applies. The
limit value is given by v∗(pa, pb, pc) = pa + pb, and if we denote by xλ the value
vλ(x0), we have for all λ ∈ (0, 1] : xλ = φ(xλ), where for all x ∈ IR,
φ(x) = max
α∈[0,1/2]
(1− λ)(1− α− αl)x+ α.
22
Since xλ ∈ (0, 1), the first order condition gives (1 − λ)xλ(−1 − lα
l−1) + 1 = 0
and we can obtain :
xλ =
1
(1− λ)
(
l
(
λ
(1− λ)(l − 1)
) l−1
l
+ 1
)−1
.
Finally we can compute an equivalent of xλ as λ goes to 0. We have(
λ
(1− λ)(l − 1)
) l−1
l
= (
1
l − 1
)
l−1
l λ
l−1
l (1 + o(λ
l−1
l ))
so that
vλ(x0) = (1− λ)
1
l
(
( 1
l−1
)
l−1
l λ
l−1
l + o(λ
2l−2
l )
)
+ 1
vλ(x0) = 1− Cλ
l−1
l + o(λ
l−1
l ) with C =
l
(l − 1)
(l−1)
l
.
3.2 Long-term values for standard MDPs
A standard Markov Decision Problem Ψ is given by a non empty set of states
X , a non empty set of actions A, a mapping q : X × A → ∆f(X) and a payoff
function g : X × A → [0, 1]. At each stage, the player learns the current state x
and chooses an action a. He then receives the payoff g(k, a), a new state is drawn
accordingly to q(k, a) and the game proceeds to the next stage.
Definition 3.15. A pure, or deterministic, strategy is a sequence of mappings
σ = (σt)t≥1 where σt : (X × A)
t−1 → A for each t. A strategy (or behavioral
strategy) is a sequence of mappings σ = (σt)t≥1 where σt : (X × A)
t−1 → ∆f (A)
for each t. We denote by Σ the set of strategies.
A pure strategy is a particular case of strategy. An initial state x1 in X and
a strategy σ naturally induce a probability distribution with finite support over
the set of finite histories (X × A)n for all n, which can be uniquely extended to
a probability over the set (X × A)∞ of infinite histories.
Definition 3.16. Given an evaluation θ and an initial state x1 in X, the θ-payoff
of a strategy σ at x1 is defined as γθ(x1, σ) = IEx1,σ
(∑
t≥1 θtg(xt, at)
)
, and the
θ-value at x1 is :
vθ(x1) = sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(x1, σ).
As for gambling houses, it is easy to see that the supremum can be taken
over the smaller set of pure strategies, and one can derive a recursive formula
linking the value functions. General limit and uniform values are defined as in
the previous subsection 3.1.
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Definition 3.17. Let Ψ = (X,A, q, g) be a standard MDP.
Ψ has a general limit value v∗ if (vθ) uniformly converges to v
∗ when I(θ) goes
to zero, i.e. for each ε > 0 one can find α > 0 such that :
∀θ, ( I(θ) ≤ α =⇒ (∀x ∈ X, |vθ(x)− v
∗(x)| ≤ ε) ) .
Ψ has a general uniform value if it has a general limit value v∗ and moreover
for each ε > 0 one can find α > 0 and a behavior strategy σ(x) for each initial
state x satisfying :
∀θ, (I(θ) ≤ α =⇒ (∀x ∈ X, γθ(x, σ(x)) ≥ v
∗(x)− ε) ) .
We now present a notion of invariance for the MDP Ψ. The next definition will
be similar to definition 3.8, however one needs to be slightly more sophisticated
here to incorporate the payoff component. Assume now that X is a compact
metric space, and define for each (u, y) in ∆f (X)× [0, 1],
Fˆ (u, y) =
{(∑
x∈X
u(x)q(x, a(x)),
∑
x∈X
u(x)g(x, a(x))
)
, where a : X → ∆f (A)
}
.
where q(x, .) and g(x, .) have been linearly extended for all x. We have defined
a correspondence Fˆ from ∆f (X)× [0, 1] to itself. It is easy to see that Fˆ always
is an affine correspondence (see lemma 3.26 later). In the following definition we
consider the closure of the graph of Fˆ within the compact set (∆(X)× [0, 1])2,
with the weak topology.
Definition 3.18. An element (u, y) in ∆(X) × [0, 1] is said to be an invariant
couple for the MDP Ψ if ((u, y), (u, y)) ∈ cl(Graph(Fˆ )). The set of invariant
couples of Ψ is denoted by RR.
Our main result for standard MDPs is the following, where X is assumed to
be a compact subset of a simplex ∆(K). Recall that D1 = {f ∈ C(∆(K)), ∀x, y ∈
∆(K), ∀a, b ≥ 0, af(x) − bf(y) ≤ ‖ax − by‖1}, and any f in D1 is linearly
extended to ∆(∆(K)).
Theorem 3.19. Let Ψ = (X,A, q, g) be a standard MDP where X is a compact
subset of a simplex ∆(K), such that :
∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, ∀f ∈ D1, ∀α ≥ 0, ∀β ≥ 0,
|αf(q(x, a))− βf(q(y, a))| ≤ ‖αx− βy‖1 and |αg(x, a)− βg(y, a)| ≤ ‖αx− βy‖1.
then Ψ has a general uniform value v∗ characterized by : for all x in X,
v∗(x) = inf
{
w(x), w : ∆(X)→ [0, 1] affine C0 s.t.
(1) ∀x′ ∈ X,w(x′) ≥ sup
a∈A
w(q(x′, a)) and (2) ∀(u, y) ∈ RR,w(u) ≥ y
}
.
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The proof of theorem 3.19 will be in section 3.4. An immediate corollary is
when the state space is finite.
Corollary 3.20. Consider a standard MDP (K,A, q, g) with a finite set of states
K. Then it has a general uniform value v∗, and for each state k :
v∗(k) = inf
{
w(k), w : ∆(K)→ [0, 1] affine s.t.
(1) ∀k′ ∈ K,w(k′) ≥ sup
a∈A
w(q(k′, a)) and (2)∀(p, y) ∈ RR,w(p) ≥ y
}
.
with RR = {(p, y) ∈ ∆(K) × [0, 1], ((p, y), (p, y)) ∈ cl(conv(Graph(F )))} and
F (k, y) = {(q(k, a), g(k, a)), a ∈ A}.
Proof : K is viewed as a subset of the simplex ∆(K), endowed with the L1-norm.
Fix k, k′ in K, a in A, α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. We have
‖αk − βk′‖ =
{
|α− β| if k = k′,
α+ β otherwise.
First,
|αg(k, a)− βg(k′, a)| ≤
{
|α− β|g(k, a) if k = k′
α + β otherwise
, so in all cases |αg(k, a) − βg(k′, a)| ≤ ‖αk − βk′‖. Secondly, consider f ∈ D1.
f takes values in [−1, 1], so similarly we have : |αf(q(k, a)) − βf(q(k′, a))| ≤
‖αk− βk′‖. So we can apply theorem 3.19, and the graph of Fˆ is the convex hull
of the graph of F . 
Remark 3.21. When the set of actions is finite, we are in the setting of Blackwell
(1962) and the value is characterized by the Average Cost Optimality Equation.
In fact in this setting, our characterization leads to a dual formulation of a result
of Denardo and Fox (1968). Denardo and Fox (1968) showed that the value v∗ is
the smallest (pointwise) excessive function for which there exists a vector h ∈ IRK
such that (v∗, h) is superharmonic in the sense of Hordjik and Kallenberg (1979)
, i.e.
∀k ∈ K, a ∈ A v∗(k) + h(k) ≥ r(k, a) +
∑
k′
q(k, a)(k′)h(k′). (2)
Given a function w the existence of a vector h such that (w, h) is superharmonic is
a linear programming problem with K×A inequalities. By Farkas’ lemma it has a
solution if and only if a dual problem has no solution, and the dual programming
problem is to find a solution π ∈ IRK×A of the following system :
∀k ∈ K
∑
a′∈A π(k, a
′) =
∑
k′∈K,a′∈A π(k
′, a′)q(k′, a′)(k)
∀(k, a) ∈ K ×A π(k, a) ≥ 0
∀k ∈ K
∑
a′∈A π(k, a)g(k, a
′) > v(k).
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If we denote by p the marginal of π on K and define for all k such that p(k) > 0,
σ(k) = π(k,a)
p(k)
and set σ(k) to any probability otherwise, then σ is a strategy in
the MDP. Moreover p is invariant under σ and the stage payoff y is greater than
v(p), thus the couple (p, y) is in RR and the condition (2) in corollary 3.20 is not
satisfied. Reciprocally since the action state is compact, given (p, y) ∈ RR, there
exists a strategy σ such that p is invariant under σ and the payoff is y. Therefore
if the condition (2) is not true then there exists h ∈ IRk such that (w, h) is
superharmonic. Note that Denardo and Fox state a dual of the minimization
problem and obtain an explicit dual maximization problem whose solution is the
value. Hordjik and Kallenberg exhibit from the solutions of this dual problem an
optimal strategy.
3.3 Proof of theorem 3.9
In this section we consider a compact metric space (X, d), and we use the
Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance d = dKR on ∆(X). We write Z = ∆f (X), Z =
∆(X). We start with a lemma.
Lemma 3.22. Let F : X ⇒ ∆f(X) be non expansive for dKR. Then the mixed
extension of F is 1-Lipschitz from ∆f(X) to ∆f (X) for dKR.
Proof of lemma 3.22. We first show that the mapping (p 7→ convF (p)) is non
expansive from X to Z. Indeed, consider p and p′ in X , and u =
∑
i∈I αiui, with
I finite, αi ≥ 0, ui ∈ F (p) for each i, and
∑
i∈I αi = 1. By assumption for each i
one can find u′i in F (p
′) such that dKR(ui, u
′
i) ≤ d(p, p
′). Define u′ =
∑
i∈I αiu
′
i in
convF (p′). We have :
dKR(u, u
′) = sup
f∈E1
(∑
i
αiui(f)−
∑
i
αiu
′
i(f)
)
,
= sup
f∈E1
∑
i∈I
αi(ui(f)− u
′
i(f)),
≤
∑
i∈I
αi dKR(ui, u
′
i),
≤ d(p, p′).
We now prove that Fˆ is 1-Lipschitz from Z to Z. Let u1, u2 be in Z and
v1 =
∑
p∈X u1(p)f1(p), where f1(p) ∈ convF (p) for each p. By the Kantorovich
duality formula, there exists a coupling γ = (γ(p, q))(p,q)∈X×X in ∆f(X×X) with
first marginal u1 and second marginal u2 satisfying :
dKR(u1, u2) =
∑
(p,q)∈X×X
γ(p, q)d(p, q).
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For each p, q in X by the first part of this proof there exists f p(q) ∈ convF (q)
such that dKR(f
p(q), f1(p)) ≤ d(p, q). We define :
f2(q) =
∑
p∈X
γ(p, q)
u2(q)
f p(q) ∈ convF (q), and v2 =
∑
q∈X
u2(q)f2(q) ∈ Fˆ (u2).
We now conclude.
dKR(v1, v2) = dKR
(∑
p∈X
u1(p)f1(p),
∑
q∈X
u2(q)f2(q)
)
= dKR
(∑
p,q
γ(p, q)f1(p),
∑
q,p
γ(p, q)f p(q)
)
≤
∑
p,q
γ(p, q)dKR(f1(p), f
p(q))
≤
∑
p,q
γ(p, q)d(p, q) = dKR(u1, u2).
The mixed extension of F is 1-lipschitz. 
We now consider a Gambling House Γ = (X,F, r) and assume the hypotheses
of theorem 3.9 are satisfied. We will work 2 with the deterministic Gambling House
Γˆ = (∆f(X), Fˆ , r). Recall that r is extended to an affine and continuous mapping
on ∆(X) whereas Fˆ is an affine non expansive correspondence from Z to Z.
For p in X , the pure plays in Γˆ at the initial state δp coincide with the mixed
plays in Γ at the initial state p. As a consequence, the θ-value for Γ at p coincides
with the θ-value for Γˆ at δp, which is written vθ(p) = vθ(δp). Because Fˆ and r are
affine on Z, the θ-value for Γˆ, as a function defined on Z, is the affine extension
of the original vθ defined on X . So we have a unique value function vθ which is
defined on Z and is affine. Because Fˆ is 1-Lipschitz and r is uniformly continuous,
all the value functions vθ have the same modulus of continuity as r, so (vθ)θ is an
equicontinuous family of mappings from Z to [0, 1]. Consequently, we extend vθ
to an affine mapping on Z with the same modulous of continuity, and the family
(vθ)θ now is an equicontinuous
3 family of mappings from Z to [0, 1].
We define R and v∗ as in the statements of theorem 3.9, so that for all x in
2. A variant of the proof would be to consider the Gambling House on ∆(X) where the
transition correspondence is defined so that its graph is the closure of the graph of Fˆ . Part 1)
of lemma 3.23 shows this correspondence is also non expansive.
3. Z being precompact, this is enough to obtain the existence of a general limit value, see
Renault 2012b. Here we will moreover obtain a characterization of this value and the existence
of the general uniform value.
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X ,
v∗(x) = inf
{
w(x), w : Z → [0, 1] affine C0 s.t.
(1) ∀y ∈ X,w(y) ≥ sup
u∈F (y)
w(u) and (2)∀u ∈ R,w(u) ≥ r(u)
}
.
We start with a technical lemma using the non-expansiveness of Fˆ .
Lemma 3.23. 1) Given (u, u′) in cl(Graph(Fˆ )), v in Z and ε > 0, there exists
v′ ∈ Fˆ (v) such that d(u′, v′) ≤ d(u, v) + ε.
2) Given a sequence (zt)t≥0 of elements of Z such that (zt, zt+1) ∈ cl(Graph(Fˆ ))
for all t ≥ 1, for each ε one can find a sequence (z′t)t≥0 of elements of Z such
that (z′t)t≥1 is a play at z
′
0, and d(zt, z
′
t) ≤ ε for each t ≥ 0.
Proof of lemma 3.23 : 1) For all ε > 0 there exists (z, z′) ∈ Graph(Fˆ ) such
that d(z, u) ≤ ε and d(z′, u′) ≤ ε. Because Fˆ is non expansive, one can find v′ in
Fˆ (v) such that d(z′, v′) ≤ d(z, v). Consequently, d(v′, u′) ≤ d(v′, z′) + d(z′, u′) ≤
d(z, v) + ε ≤ d(u, v) + 2ε.
2) It is first easy to construct (z′0, z
′
1) in the graph of Fˆ such that d(z
′
0, z0) ≤ ε
and d(z′1, z1) ≤ ε. (z1, z2) ∈ cl(Graph(Fˆ )) so by 1) one can find (z
′
2) in Fˆ (z
′
1) such
that d(z2, z
′
2) ≤ d(z1, z
′
1) + ε
2 ≤ ε + ε2. Iterating, we construct a play (z′t)t≥1 at
z′0 such that d(zt, z
′
t) ≤ ε+ ε
2 + ... + εt for each t.
Proposition 3.24. Γ has a general limit value given by v∗.
Proof of proposition 3.24 : By Ascoli’s theorem, it is enough to show that
any limit point of (vθ)θ (for the uniform convergence) coincides with v
∗. We thus
assume that (vθk)k uniformly converges to v on Z when k goes to∞, for a family
of evaluations satisfying : ∑
t≥1
|θkt+1 − θ
k
t | −→k→∞ 0.
And we need to show that v = v∗.
A) We first show that v ≥ v∗.
It is plain that v can be extended to an affine function on Z and has the
same modulus of continuity of r. Because
∑
t≥1 |θ
k
t+1− θ
k
t | −→k→∞ 0, we have by
equation (1) of section 3.1 that : ∀y ∈ X, v(y) = supu∈F (y) v(u).
Let now u be in R. By lemma 3.23 for each ε one can find u0 in Z and a play
(u1, u2, ..., ut, ...) such that ut ∈ Fˆ (ut−1) and d(u, ut) ≤ ε for all t ≥ 0. Because r
is uniformly continuous, we get v(u) ≥ r(u).
By definition of v∗ as an infimum, we obtain : v∗ ≤ v.
B) We show that v∗ ≥ v. Let w be a continous affine mapping from Z to [0, 1]
satisfying (1) and (2) of the definition of v∗. It is enough to show that w(p) ≥ v(p)
for each p in X . Fix p in X and ε > 0.
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For each k, let σk = (uk1, ..., u
k
t , ...) ∈ Z
∞ be a play at δp for Γˆ which is almost
optimal for the θk-value, in the sense that
∑
t≥1 θ
k
t r(u
k
t ) ≥ vθk(p)− ε. Define :
u(k) =
∞∑
t=1
θkt u
k
t ∈ Z, and u
′(k) =
∞∑
t=1
θkt u
k
t+1 ∈ Z.
u(k) and u′(k) are well-defined limits of normal convergent series in the Banach
space C(X)′. Because Fˆ is affine, its graph is a convex set and (u(k), u′(k)) ∈
cl(Graph(Fˆ )) for each k.
Moreover, we have d(u(k), u′(k)) ≤ diam(X)(θk1 +
∑∞
t=2 |θ
k
t − θ
k
t−1|), where
diam(X) is the diameter of X . Consequently,
∑
t≥1 |θ
k
t+1 − θ
k
t | −→k→∞ 0 implies
d(u(k), u′(k)) −→k→∞ 0. Considering a limit point of the sequence (u(k), u
′(k))k,
we obtain some u in R. By assumption on w, w(u) ≥ r(u). Moreover, for each k
we have r(u(k)) =
∑
t≥1 θ
k
t r(u
k
t ) ≥ vθk(p)− ε, so r(u) ≥ v(p)− ε.
Because w is excessive, we obtain that for each k the sequence (w(ukt ))t is non
increasing, so w(u(k)) =
∑
t≥1 θ
k
tw(u
k
t ) ≤ w(p). So we obtain :
w(p) ≥ w(u) ≥ r(u) ≥ v(p)− ε.
This is true for all ε, so w ≥ v. 
Proposition 3.25. Γ has a general uniform value.
Proof of proposition 3.25 : First we can extend the notion of mixed play to
Z. A mixed play at u0 ∈ Z, is a sequence σ = (u1, ..., ut, ...) ∈ Z
∞ such that
ut+1 ∈ Fˆ (ut) for each t ≥ 0, and we denote by Σ(u0) the set of mixed play
at u0. Given t, T in IN , n ∈ IN
∗ and u0 ∈ Z, we define for each mixed play
σ = (ut)t≥1 ∈ Σ(u0) the auxiliary payoff :
γt,n(σ) =
1
n
t+n∑
l=t+1
r(ul), and βT,n(σ) = inf
t∈{0,...,T}
γt,n(σ).
And we also define the auxiliary value function : for all u in Z,
hT,n(u0) = sup
σ∈Σ(u0)
βT,n(σ).
Clearly, βT,n(σ) ≤ γ0,n(σ) and hT,n(u0) ≤ vn(u0). We can write :
hT,n(u0) = sup
σ∈Σ(u0)
inf
θ∈∆({0,...,T})
1
n
T∑
t=0
θt
t+n∑
l=t+1
r(ul)
= sup
σ∈Σ(u0)
inf
θ∈∆({0,...,T})
T+n∑
l=1
βl(θ, n)r(ul).
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where for each l in 1, ..., T + n,
βl(θ, n) =
1
n
Min{T,l−1}∑
t=Max{0,l−n}
θt.
By construction, Fˆ is affine, so Σ(u0) is a convex subset of Z
∞. ∆({0, ..., T}) is
convex compact and the payoff
∑T+n
l=1 βl(θ, n)r(ul) is affine both in θ and in σ.
We can apply a standard minmax theorem to get :
hT,n(u0) = inf
θ∈∆({0,...,T})
sup
σ∈Σ(u0)
T+n∑
l=1
βl(θ, n)r(ul).
We write θt = 0 for t > T and for each l ≥ 0 : βl(n, θ) =
1
n
(θ0 + ... + θl−1)
if l ≤ n, βl(θ, n) =
1
n
(θl−n + ... + θl−1) if n + 1 ≤ l ≤ n + T , βl(n, θ) = 0
if l > n + T . The evaluation β(θ, n) is a particular probability on stages and
hT,n(u0) = infθ∈∆({0,...,T}) vβ(θ,n)(u0). It is easy to bound the impatience of β(θ, n) :
∑
l≥0
|βl+1(θ, n)− βl(θ, n)| =
n−1∑
l=0
θl
n
+
∑
l≥n
1
n
|θl − θl−n| ≤
3
n
−→n→∞ 0.
The impatience of β(θ, n) goes to zero as n goes to infinity, uniformly in θ. So we
can use the previous proposition 3.24 to get :
∀ε > 0, ∃n0, ∀n ≥ n0, ∀θ ∈ ∆(IN), ∀u0 ∈ Z, |vβ(θ,n)(u0)− v
∗(u0)| ≤ ε.
This implies that h∞,n(u0) :=def infθ∈∆(IN) vβ(θ,n)(u0) = infT≥0 hT,n(u0) converges
to v∗(u0) when n→∞, and the convergence is uniform over Z. Consequently, if
we fix ε > 0 there exists n0 such that for all u0 in Z, for all T ≥ 0, there exists a
play σT = (uTt )t≥1 in Σ(u0) such that the average payoff is good on every interval
of n0 stages starting before T + 1 : for all t = 0, ..., T , γt,n0(σ
T ) ≥ v∗(u0)− ε.
We fix u0 in Z and consider, for each T , the play σ
T = (uTt )t≥1 in Σ(u) as
above. By a diagonal argument we can construct for each t ≥ 1 a limit point zt in
Z of the sequence (uTt )T≥0 such that for each t we have (zt, zt+1) ∈ cl(Graph(Fˆ )),
with z0 = u0. For each m ≥ 0, we have
1
n0
∑m+1+n0
t=m+1 r(u
T
t ) ≥ v
∗(u0)−ε for T large
enough, so at the limit we get : 1
n0
∑m+1+n0
t=m+1 r(zt) ≥ v
∗(u0)− ε.
r being uniformly continuous, there exists α such that |r(z)−r(z′)| ≤ ε as soon
as d(z, z′) ≤ α. By lemma 3.23, one can find a σ′ = (z′1, ...., z
′
t, ...) at Σ(z0) such
that for each t, d(zt, z
′
t) ≤ α. We obtain that for each m ≥ 0,
1
n0
∑m+1+n0
t=m+1 r(z
′
t) ≥
v∗(u)− 2ε.
Consequently we have proved : ∀ε > 0, there exists n0 such that for all initial
state p in X , there exists a mixed play σ′ = (z′t)t at p such that : ∀m ≥ 0,
1
n0
∑m+1+n0
t=m+1 r(z
′
t) ≥ v
∗(p)−2ε. Let θ ∈ ∆(IN∗) be an evaluation, it is now easy to
conclude. First if v∗(p)− 2ǫ < 0, then any play is 2ǫ-optimal. Otherwise, for each
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j ≥ 1, denote by θj the maximum of θ on the block B
j = {(j− 1)n0+1, ..., jn0}.
For all t ∈ Bj, we have :
θj ≥ θt ≥ θj −
∑
t′∈{(j−1)n0+1,...jn0−1}
|θt′+1 − θt′ |.
As a consequence, for all j we have :
jn0∑
t=(j−1)n0+1
θtr(z
′
t) ≥ θj
jn0∑
t=(j−1)n0+1
r(z′t) − n0
∑
t′∈{(j−1)n0+1,...,jn0−1}
|θt′+1 − θt′ |
≥
jn0∑
t=(j−1)n0+1
θt(v
∗(p)− 2ε) − n0
∑
t′∈{(j−1)n0+1,...,jn0−1}
|θt′+1 − θt′ |
and by summing over j, we get : γθ(x0, σ
′) ≥ v∗(p)− 2ǫ− n0I(θ) ≥ v
∗(p)− 3ǫ as
soon as I(θ) is small enough. 
3.4 Proof of theorem 3.19
Assume thatX is a compact subset of a simplex ∆(K), and let Ψ = (X,A, q, g)
be a standard MDP such that : ∀x ∈ X, ∀y ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, ∀f ∈ D1, ∀α ≥ 0, ∀β ≥
0,
|αf(q(x, a))− βf(q(y, a))| ≤ ‖αx− βy‖1 and |αg(x, a)− βg(y, a)| ≤ ‖αx− βy‖1.
We write Z = ∆f (X)× [0, 1], and Z = ∆(X)× [0, 1]. We will use the metric d∗ =
d0 = d1 = d2 = d3 on ∆(∆(K)) introduced in section 2.3 and its restriction to
∆(X), so that Z is a compact metric space. For all (u, y), (u′, y′) ∈ ∆f (X)× [0, 1],
we put d((u, y), (u′, y′)) = max(d∗(u, u
′), |y − y′|) so that (Z, d) is a precompact
metric space. Recall we have defined the correspondence Fˆ from Z to itself such
that for all (u, y) in Z,
Fˆ (u, y) = {(Q(u, σ), G(u, σ)) s.t. σ : X → ∆f (A)} ,
with the notationsQ(u, σ) =
∑
x∈X u(x)q(x, σ(x)) andG(u, σ) =
∑
x∈X u(x)g(x, σ(x)).
And we simply define the payoff function r from Z to [0, 1] by r(u, y) = y for all
(u, y) in Z. We start with a crucial lemma, which shows the importance of the
duality formula of theorem 2.18.
Lemma 3.26. Fˆ is an affine and non expansive correspondence from Z to itself.
Proof of lemma 3.26. We first show that : ∀u, u′ ∈ ∆f(X), ∀α ∈ [0, 1], ∀y, y
′ ∈
[0, 1], Fˆ (αu + (1 − α)u′, αy + (1 − α)y′) = αFˆ (u, y) + (1 − α)Fˆ (u′, y′). First
the transition does not depend on the second coordinate so we can forget it for
the rest of the proof. The ⊂ part is clear. To see the reverse inclusion, consider
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σ : X → ∆f(A), σ
′ : X → ∆f (A) and v = α
∑
x∈X u(x)q(x, σ(x)) + (1 −
α)
∑
x∈X u
′(x)q(x, σ′(x)) in αFˆ (u) + (1− α)Fˆ (u′). Define
σ∗(x) =
αu(x)σ(x) + (1− α)u′(x)σ′(x)
αu(x) + (1− α)u′(x)
,
for each x such that the denominator is positive. Then v =
∑
x∈X(αu + (1 −
α)u′(x))q(x, σ∗(x)), and Fˆ is affine.
We now prove that Fˆ is non expansive. Let z = (u, y) and z′ = (u′, y′) be in
Z. We have d((u, y), (u′, y′)) ≥ d∗(u, u
′) and denote by U and U ′ the respective
supports of u and u′. By the duality formula of theorem 2.18, there exists α =
(α(p, p′))(p,p′)∈U×U ′ and β = (β(p, p
′))(p,p′)∈U×U ′ with non-negative coordinates
satisfying :
∑
p′∈U ′ α(p, p
′) = u(p) for all p ∈ U ,
∑
p∈U β(p, p
′) = u′(p′) for all
p′ ∈ U ′, and
d∗(u, u
′) =
∑
(p,p′)∈U×U ′
‖p α(p, p′)− p′ β(p, p′)‖1.
Consider now v = Q(u, σ) =
∑
p∈U u(p)q(p, σ(p)) for some σ : X → ∆f (A).
We define for all p′ in U ′ :
σ′(p′) =
∑
p∈U
β(p, p′)
u′(p′)
σ(p),
and v′ = Q(u′, σ′) =
∑
p′∈U ′ u
′(p′)q(p′, σ′(p′)). Then v′ ∈ Fˆ (u′, y′), and for each
test function ϕ in D1 we have :
|ϕ(v)− ϕ(v′)| = |
∑
p,p′
α(p, p′)ϕ(q(p, σ(p)))− β(p, p′)ϕ(q(p′, σ(p)))|
= |
∑
p,p′,a
α(p, p′)σ(p)(a)ϕ(q(p, a))− β(p, p′)σ(p)(a)ϕ(q(p′, a))|
≤
∑
p,p′
‖α(p, p′)p− β(p, p′)p′‖1 = d∗(u, u
′),
and therefore d∗(v, v
′) ≤ d∗(u, u
′). In addition we have a similar result on the
payoff,
|G(u, σ)−G(u′, σ′)| = |
∑
p,p′
α(p, p′)g(p, σ(p))− β(p, p′)g(p′, σ(p))|
≤
∑
p,p′
‖α(p, p′)p− β(p, p′)p′‖1
≤ d∗(u, u
′).
Thus we have d((Q(u, σ), R(u, σ)), (Q(u′, σ′), R(u′, σ′))) ≤ d∗(u, u
′) ≤ d(z, z′). 
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Recall that the set of invariant couples of the MDP Ψ is :
RR = {(u, y) ∈ Z, ((u, y), (u, y)) ∈ cl(Graph(Fˆ ))},
and the function v∗ : X −→ IR is defined by :
v∗(x) = inf
{
w(x), w : ∆(X)→ [0, 1] affine C0 s.t.
(1) ∀y ∈ X,w(y) ≥ sup
a∈A
w(q(y, a)) and (2) ∀(u, y) ∈ RR,w(u) ≥ y
}
.
We now consider the deterministic Gambling House Γˆ = (Z, Fˆ , r). Z is pre-
compact metric, Fˆ is affine non expansive and r is obviously affine and uniformly
continuous. Given an evaluation θ, the θ-value of Γˆ at z0 = (u, y) is denoted by
vˆθ(u, y) = vˆθ(u) and does not depend on y. The recursive formula of section 3.1
yields :
∀(u, y) ∈ Z, vˆθ(u) = sup
(u′,y′)∈Fˆ (u)
θ1y
′ + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(u
′)
= sup
σ∈X→∆f (A)
(θ1G(u, σ) + (1− θ1)vˆθ+(Q(u, σ))) .
Because Fˆ and r are affine, vˆθ is affine in u and the supremum in the above ex-
pression can be taken over the function from X to A. Because Fˆ is non expansive
and r is 1-Lipschitz, each vˆθ is 1-Lipschitz.
We denote by vθ the θ-value of the MDP Ψ and linearly extend it to ∆f (X).
It turns out that the recursive formula satisfied by vθ is similar to the above
recursive formula for vˆθ, so that vθ(u) = vˆθ(u, y) for all u in ∆f (X) and y in [0, 1].
As a consequence, the existence of the general limit value in both problems Γˆ
and Ψ is equivalent. Moreover, a deterministic play in Γˆ induces a strategy in Ψ,
so that the existence of a general uniform value in Γˆ will imply the existence of
the general uniform value in Ψ (note that deterministic and mixed plays in Γˆ are
equivalent since Fˆ has convex values).
It is thus sufficient to show that Γˆ has a general uniform value given by v∗,
and we can mimic the end of the proof of theorem 3.9. Lemma 3.23 applies word
for word. Finally, one can proceed almost exactly as in propositions 3.24 and 3.25
to show that Γˆ, hence Ψ, has a general uniform value given by v∗.
4 Applications to partial observation and games
4.1 POMDP with finitely many states
We now consider a more general model of MDP with actions where after each
stage, the decision maker does not perfectly observe the state. A MDP with partial
observation, or POMDP, Γ = (K,A, S, q, g) is given by a finite set of states K, a
non empty set of actions A and a non empty set of signals S. The transition q now
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goes from K×A to ∆f(S×K) (by assumption the support of the signals at each
state is finite) and the payoff function g still goes from K ×A to [0, 1]. Given an
initial probability p1 on K, the POMDP Γ(p1) is played as following. An initial
state k1 in K is selected according to p1 and is not told to the decision maker. At
every stage t he selects an action at ∈ A. He has a (unobserved) payoff g(kt, at)
and a pair (st, kt+1) is drawn according to q(kt, at). The player learns st, and the
play proceeds to stage t+1 with the new state kt+1. A behavioral strategy is now
a sequence (σt)t≥1 of applications with for each t, σt : (A × S)
t−1 → ∆f(A). As
usual, an initial probability on K and a behavior strategy σ induce a probability
distribution over (K × A × S)∞ and we can define the θ-values and the notions
of general limit and uniform values accordingly.
Theorem 4.1. A POMDP with finitely many states has a general uniform value,
i.e. there exists v∗ : ∆(K) → IR with the following property : for each ε > 0 one
can find α > 0 and for each initial probability p a behavior strategy σ(p) such that
for each evaluation θ with I(θ) ≤ α,
∀p ∈ ∆(K), |vθ(p)− v
∗(p)| ≤ ε and γθ(σ(p)) ≥ v
∗(p)− ε.
Proof : We introduce Ψ an auxiliary MDP on X = ∆(K) with the same set of
actions A and the following payoff and transition functions :
• r : X × A −→ [0, 1] such that r(p, a) =
∑
k∈K p(k)g(k, a) for all p
in X and a ∈ A,
• qˆ : X × A→ ∆f(X) such that
qˆ(p, a) =
∑
s∈S
(∑
k
pkq(k, a)(s)
)
δqˆ(p,a,s),
where qˆ(p, a, s) ∈ ∆(K) is the belief on the new state after playing a
at p and observing the signal s :
∀k′ ∈ K, qˆ(p, a, s)(k′) =
q(p, a)(k′, s)
q(p, a)(s)
=
∑
k p
kq(k, a)(k′, s)∑
k p
kq(k, a)(s)
.
The POMDP Γ(p1) and the standard MDP Ψ(p1) have the same value for
all θ-evaluations. And for each strategy σ in Ψ(p1), the player can guarantee the
same payoff in the original game Γ(p1) by mimicking the strategy σ. So if we
prove that Ψ has a general uniform value it will imply that the POMDP Γ has a
general uniform value.
To conclude the proof, we will simply apply theorem 3.19 to the MDP Ψ. We
need to check the assumptions on the payoff and on the transition.
Consider any p, p′ in X , a ∈ A, α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. We have :
|αr(p, a)− βr(p′, a)| = |
∑
k
(αp(k)− βp′(k))g(k, a)| ≤ ‖αp− βp′‖
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Moreover for any f ∈ D1, we have :
|αqˆ(p, a)(f)− βqˆ(p′, a)(f)| = |
∑
s∈S
(αq(p, a)(s)f(qˆ(p, a, s))− βq(p′, a)(s)f(qˆ(p′, a, s))) |
≤
∑
s
‖αq(p, a)(., s)− βq(p′, a)(., s)‖
≤
∑
s,k,k′
|αp(k′)q(k′, a)(k, s)− βp′(k′)q(k′, a)(k, s)|
≤
∑
s,k,k′
q(k′, a)(k, s)|αp(k′)− βp′(k′)| = ‖αp− βp′‖.
where the first inequality comes from the definition of D1.
By theorem 3.19, the MDP Ψ has a general uniform value and we deduce that
the POMDP Γ has a general uniform value. 
Example 4.2. Let Γ = (K,A, S, q, g, p1) be a POMDP where K = {k1, k2},
A = {a, b}, S = {s} and p1 = δk1. The initial state is k1 and since there is only
one signal, the decision maker will obtain no additional information on the state.
We say that he is in the dark. The payoff is given by g(0, a) = g(0, b) = g(1, b) = 0
and g(1, a) = 1, and the transition by q(1, a) = q(1, b) = δ1,s, q(0, a) = δ0,s and
q(0, b) = 1
2
δ0,s +
1
2
δ1,s. On one hand if the decision maker plays a then the state
stays the same and he receives a payoff of 1 if and only if the state is 1, on the
other hand if he plays b then he receives a payoff of 0 but the probability to be
in state 1 increases.
We define the function r from X = ∆(K) to [0, 1] by r((p, 1− p), a) = 1 − p
and r((p, 1− p), b) = 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1], and the function qˆ from X to ∆f(X) by
qˆ((p, 1− p), a) = δ(p,1−p) and qˆ((p, 1− p), b) = δ(p/2,1−p/2).
Then the standard MDP Ψ = (∆(K), A, r, qˆ) is the MDP associated in the pre-
vious proof to Γ. This MDP is deterministic since the decision maker is in the
dark.
In this example, the existence of a general uniform value is immediate. If we
fix n ∈ IN , the strategy σ = bna∞ which plays n times b and then a for the rest
of the game, guarantees a stage payoff of (1 − 1
2n
) from stage n + 1 on, so the
game has a general uniform value equal to 1. Finally if we consider the discounted
evaluations, one can show that the speed of convergence of vλ is slower than λ :
vλ(p1) = 1−
ln(λ)
ln(2)
λ+O(λ).
All the spaces are finite but the partial observation implies that the speed of
convergence is slower than λ contrary to the perfect observation case where it is
well known that the convergence is in O(λ).
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Remark 4.3. It is unknown if the uniform value exists in pure strategies, i.e. if the
behavior strategies σ(p) of theorem 4.1 can be chosen with values in A. This was
already an open problem for the Cesa`ro-uniform value (see Rosenberg et al. 2002
and Renault 2011 for different proofs requiring the use of behavioral strategies).
In our proof, there are two related places where the use of lotteries on actions is
important. First in the proof of the convergence of the function hT,n (within the
proof of theorem 3.9), we used Sion’s theorem in order to inverse a supremum and
an infimum so we need the convexity of the set of strategies. Secondly when we
prove that the extended transition is 1-Lipschitz (see lemma 3.26), the coupling
between the two distributions u and u′ introduces some randomization.
4.2 Zero-sum repeated games with an informed controller
We finally consider zero-sum repeated games with an informed controller. We
start with a general model Γ = (K, I, J, C,D, q, g) of zero-sum repeated game,
where we have 5 non empty finite sets : a set of states K, two sets of actions I and
J and two sets of signals C and D, and we also have a transition mapping q from
K×I×J to ∆(K×C×D) and a payoff function g from K×I×J to [0, 1]. Given
an initial probability π on ∆(K×C×D), the game Γ(π) = Γ(K, I, J, C,D, q, g, π)
is played as follows : at stage 1, a triple (k1, c1, d1) is drawn according to π, player
1 learns c1 and player 2 learns d1. Then simultaneously player 1 chooses an action
i1 in I and player 2 chooses an action j1 in J . Player 1 gets a (unobserved) payoff
r(k1, i1, j1) and player 2 the opposite. Then a new triple (k2, c2, d2) is drawn
accordingly to q(k1, i1, j1). Player 1 observes c2, player 2 observes d2 and the
game proceeds to the next stage, etc...
A (behavioral) strategy for player 1 is a sequence σ = (σt)t≥1 where for each
t ≥ 1, σt is a mapping from (C×I)
t−1×C to ∆(I). Similarly a strategy for player
2 is a sequence of mappings τ = (τt)t≥1 where for each t ≥ 1 ,τt is a mapping from
(D×J)t−1×D to ∆(J). We denote respectively by Σ and τ the set of strategies
of player 1 and player 2. An initial distribution π and a couple of strategies (σ, τ)
defines for each t a probability on the possible histories up to stage t. And by
Kolmogorov extension theorem, it can be uniquely extended to a probability on
the set of infinite histories (K × C ×D × I × J)+∞.
Given θ an evaluation function, we define the θ-payoff of (σ, τ) in Γ(π) as the
expectation under IPπ,σ,τ of the payoff function,
γθ(π, σ, τ) = IEπ,σ,τ
(∑
t
θt r(kt, it, jt)
)
.
By Sion’s theorem the game γθ(π) has a value :
vθ(π) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈τ
γθ(π, σ, τ) = min
τ∈τ
max
σ∈Σ
γθ(π, σ, τ),
and we can define the general limit value as in the MDP framework. Note that
we do not ask the convergence to be uniform for all π in ∆(K ×C ×D), because
we will later make some assumptions, in particular on the initial distribution.
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Definition 4.4. The repeated game Γ(π) = (K, I, J, C,D, q, g, π) has a general
limit value v∗(π) if vθ(π) converges to v
∗(π) when I(θ) goes to zero, i.e. :
∀ε > 0, ∃α > 0, ∀θ, ( I(θ) ≤ α =⇒ (|vθ(π)− v
∗(π)| ≤ ε) ) .
And we can define a general uniform value by symmetrizing the definition for
MDP.
Definition 4.5. The repeated game Γ(π) has a general uniform value if it has
a general limit value v∗ and for each ε > 0 one can find α > 0 and a couple of
strategies σ∗ and τ ∗ such that for all evaluations θ with I(θ) ≤ α :
∀τ ∈ τ , γθ(π, σ∗, τ) ≥ v∗(π)− ε and ∀σ ∈ Σ, γθ(π, σ, τ ∗) ≤ v∗(π) + ε.
We now focus on the case of a repeated game with an informed controller. We
follow the definitions introduced in Renault (2012a). The first one concerns the
information of the first player. We assume that he is always fully informed of the
state and of the signal of the second player :
Assumption 4.6. There exist two mappings k˜ : C → K and d˜ : C → D such
that, if E denotes {(k, c, d) ∈ K × C × D, k˜(c) = k, d˜(c) = d}, we have :
∀(k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J , q(k, i, j)(E) = 1, and π(E) = 1.
Moreover we will assume that only player 1 has a meaningful influence on the
transitions, in the following sense.
Assumption 4.7. The marginal of the transition on K ×D is not influenced by
player 2’s action. For k in K, i in I and j in J , we denote by q¯(k, i) the marginal
of q(k, i, j) on K ×D.
The second player may influence the signal of the first player but he can not
prevent him neither to learn the state nor to learn his own signal. Moreover he can
not influence his own information, thus he has no influence on his beliefs about the
state or about the beliefs of player 1 about his beliefs. A repeated game satisfying
assumptions 4.6 and 4.7 is called a repeated game with an informed controller.
It was proved in Renault (2012a) that for such games the Cesa`ro-uniform value
exists and we will generalize it here to the general uniform value.
Example 4.8. We consider Γ a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete in-
formation as studied by Aumann and Maschler (see reference from 1995). It is
defined by a finite family (Gk)k∈K of payoff matrices in [0, 1]
I×J and p ∈ ∆(K)
an initial probability. At the first stage, some state k is selected according to
p and told to player 1 only. The second player knows the initial distribution p
but not the realization. Then the matrix game Gk is repeated over and over.
At each stage the players observe past actions but not their payoff. Formally it
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is a zero-sum repeated game Γ = (K, I, J, C,D, q, g) as defined previously, with
C = K×I×J and D = I×J , and for all (k, i, j) ∈ K×I×J , g(k, i, j) = Gk(i, j)
and q(k, i, j) = δk,(k,i,j),(i,j). For all p ∈ ∆(K), we denote by Γ(p) the game where
the initial probability π ∈ ∆(K×C×D) is given by π =
∑
k∈K p(k)δk,(k,i0,j0),(i0,j0)
with (i0, j0) ∈ I × J fixed.
For each n, we denote by vn(p) the value of the n-stage game with initial
probability p, where the payoff is the expected mean average of the n first stages.
It is known that it satisfies the following dynamic programming formula :
vn(p) = sup
a∈∆(I)K
(
1
n
r(p, a) +
n− 1
n
∑
k∈K,i∈I
pkak(i)vn−1(qˆ(p, a, i))
)
.
where p ∈ ∆(K), r(p, a) = minj(
∑
k p
kGk(ak, j)) and qˆ(p, a, i) is the conditional
belief on ∆(K) given p, a, i :
qˆ(p, a, i)(k′) =
∑
k p(k)a
k(i)q(k, i)(k′)∑
k p(k)a
k(i)
.
Starting from a belief p about the state, if player 2 observes action i and knows
that the distribution of actions of player 1 is a, then he updates his beliefs to
qˆ(p, a, i). Aumann and Maschler have proved that the limit value exists and is
characterized by
v∗ = cavf ∗ = inf{v : ∆(K)→ [0, 1], v concave v ≥ f ∗},
where f ∗(p) = V al
(∑
k p
kGk
)
for all p ∈ ∆(K). The function f ∗ is the value of
the game, called the non-revealing game, where player 1 is forbidden to use his
information.
Theorem 4.9. A zero-sum repeated game with an informed controller has a ge-
neral uniform value.
Proof of theorem 4.9 : Assume that Γ(π) = (K, I, J, C,D, q, g, π) is a repeated
game with an informed controller. The proof will consist of 5 steps. First we in-
troduce an auxiliary standard Markov Decision Process Ψ(πˆ) on the state space
X = ∆(K). Then we show that for all evaluations θ, the repeated game Γ(π)
and the MDP Ψ(πˆ) have the same θ-value. In step 3 we check that the MDP
satisfies the assumption of theorem 3.19 so it has a general limit value and a
general uniform value v∗. As a consequence the repeated game has a general limit
value v∗(π). Then we prove that player 1 can use an ǫ-optimal strategy of the
auxilliary MDP in order to guarantee v∗(π)− ǫ in the original game. Finally we
prove that Player 2 can play by blocks in the repeated game in order to guarantee
v∗(π) + ǫ. And we obtain that v∗(π) can be guaranteed by both players in the
repeated game, so it is the general uniform value of Γ(π).
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For every P ∈ ∆(K × C ×D), we denote by P the marginal of P on K ×D
and we put Pˆ = ψD(P ) where ψD is the disintegration with respect to D (recall
proposition 2.21) : for all µ ∈ ∆(K ×D), ψD(µ) =
∑
d∈D µ(d)δµ(.|d).
Step 1 : We put X = ∆(K) and A = ∆(I)K and for every p in X , a in A
and b in ∆(J), we define :
r(p, a, b) =
∑
(k,i,j)∈K×I×J
pkak(i)b(j)g(k, i, j) ∈ [0, 1],
r(p, a) = inf
b∈∆(J)
r(p, a, b) = inf
j∈J
r(p, a, j),
q(p, a) =
∑
(k,i)∈K×I
pkak(i)q(k, i) ∈ ∆(K ×D),
qˆ(p, a) = ψD(q(p, a)) =
∑
d∈D
q(p, a)(d)δqˆ(p,a,d) ∈ ∆f (X).
Here qˆ(p, a, d) ∈ ∆(K) is the belief of the second player on the new state after
observing the signal d and knowing that player 1 has played a at p :
∀k′ ∈ K, qˆ(p, a, d)(k′) =
q(p, a)(k′, d)
q(p, a)(d)
=
∑
k p
kq(k, a(k))(k′, d)∑
k p
kq(k, a(k))(d)
.
We define the auxiliary MDP Ψ = (X,A, qˆ, r), and denote the θ-value in the MDP
by vˆθ. The MDP with initial state πˆ has strong links with the repeated game Γ(π).
Step 2 : By proposition 4.23, part b) in Renault 2012a), we have for all
evaluations θ with finite support :
vθ(π) = vˆθ(πˆ).
The proof relies on the same recursive formula satisfied by v and vˆ, and the
equality can be easily extended to any evaluation θ.
∀θ ∈ ∆(IN∗), ∀p ∈ X, vθ(p) = sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
( θ1r(p, a, b) + (1− θ1)vθ+(qˆ(p, a)) ) .
where vθ+ is naturally linearly extended to ∆f (X). As a consequence if Ψ(πˆ) has
a general limit value so does the repeated game Γ(π).
Step 3 : Let us check that Ψ satisfies the assumption of 3.19. Consider p, p′
in X , a in A, and α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0. We have :
|αr(p, a)− βr(p′, a)| ≤ sup
b∈∆(J)
|αr(p, a, b)− βr(p′, a, b)|
≤ sup
b∈∆(J)
|
∑
k∈K
αpkg(k, ak, b)− βp′kg(k, ak, b)|
≤ sup
b∈∆(J)
∑
k∈K
|αpk − βp′k| = ‖αp− βp′‖1.
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Moreover, let ϕ : ∆(K) −→ IR be in D1.
|αϕ(qˆ(p, a))− βϕ(qˆ(p′, a))| =
∑
d∈D
(αq¯(p, a)(d)ϕ(qˆ(p, a, d))− βq¯(p′, a)(d)ϕ(qˆ(p′, a, d)))
≤
∑
d∈D
‖α q¯(p, a)(d) qˆ(p, a, d)− β q¯(p′, a)(d) qˆ(p′, a, d)‖1
≤
∑
d∈D
‖α (q¯(p, a)(k′, d))k′ − β (q¯(p
′, a)(k′, d))k′‖1
≤
∑
d∈D
∑
k∈K
‖αpk (q¯(k, a)(k′, d))k′ − βp
′k (q¯(k, a)(k′, d))k′‖1
≤
∑
d∈D
∑
k′∈K
∑
k∈K
q¯(k, a)(k′, d)|αpk − βp′k| = ‖αp− βp′‖1.
So Ψ = (X,A, qˆ, r) has a general limit value and a general uniform value that
we denote by v∗. As a consequence, Γ(π) has a general limit value v∗(π).
Step 4 : Given ε > 0, there exists α > 0 and a strategy σ in the MDP Ψ(πˆ)
such that the θ-payoff in the MDP is large : γˆθ(πˆ, σ) ≥ v
∗(π)−ε whenever I(θ) ≤
α. Moreover if we look at the end of the proof of theorem 3.19 we can choose σ
to be induced by a deterministic play in the Gambling House Γˆ with state space
Z = ∆f(X) × [0, 1]. As a consequence one can mimic σ to construct a strategy
σ∗ in the original repeated game Γ(π) such that : ∀τ ∈ τ , γθ(π, σ∗, τ) ≥ v∗(π)− ε
whenever I(θ) ≤ α.
Step 5 : Finally we show that player 2 can also guarantee the value v∗ in
the repeated game Γ. Note that in the repeated game he can not compute the
state variable in ∆(K) without knowing the strategy of player 1. Nevertheless
he has no influence on the transition function so playing independently by large
blocks will be sufficient for him in order to guarantee v∗(π). We use the following
characterization of the value proved in Renault (2012a) :
v∗(π) = inf
n
sup
m
vm,n(π).
where vm,n is the value of the game with payoff function the Cesa`ro mean of the
stage payoffs between stages m and m + n. We proceed as in proposition 4.22
of Renault 2012a. Fix n0 ≥ 1, then we consider the strategy τ
∗ which for each
j ∈ IN , plays optimally in the game with the evaluation the Cesa`ro mean for the
payoffs on the block of stages Bj = {n0(j−1)+1, ..., n0j}. Since player 2 does not
influence the state it is well defined and this strategy guarantees supt≥0 vt,n0(z)
for the overall Cesa`ro mean.
Let θ ∈ ∆(IN∗) and σ be a strategy of player 1. For each j ≥ 1, denote by θj
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the minimum of θ on the block Bj = {(j − 1)n0 + 1, ..., jn0}. We have
γθ(π, σ, τ
∗) =
+∞∑
j=1
IEπ,σ,τ∗
 jn0∑
t=(j−1)n0+1
θt g(kt, at, bt)

≤
+∞∑
j=1
n0 θj sup
t≥0
vt,n0(π) + n0
+∞∑
t=1
|θt+1 − θt|
≤ sup
t≥0
vt,n0(π) + n0I(θ).
Given ǫ, there exists n0 such that supt≥0 vt,n0(π) ≤ v
∗(π) + ǫ. Fix α = ǫ
n0
and τ ∗
defined as before then for all θ such that I(θ) ≤ α, we have
sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(π, σ, τ
∗) ≤ v∗(π) + 2ǫ,
and this concludes the proof of theorem 4.9. 
Example 4.10. The computation of the value in two-player repeated game with
incomplete information is a difficult problem as shown in the next example intro-
duced in Renault (2006) and partially solved by Ho¨rner et al. (2010). The value
exists by a theorem in Renault (2006) but the value has been computed only for
some values of the parameters. The set of states is K = {k1, k2}, the set of actions
of player 1 is I = {T,B}, the set of actions of player 2 is J = {L,R}, and the
payoff is given by
L R L R
T
B
(
1 0
0 0
)
and
T
B
(
0 0
0 1
)
.
k1 k2
The evolution of the state does not depend on the actions : at each stage the state
stays the same with probability p and changes to the other state with probability
1−p. At each stage, both players observe the past actions played but only player
1 is informed of the current state (with previous notation C = K × I × J and
D = I × J). For each p ∈ [0, 1], it defines a repeated game Γp. In the case p = 1,
the matrix is fixed for all the game thus it is a repeated game with incomplete
information on one side a` la Aumann Maschler (1995). For all other positive
values of p, the process is ergodic so the limit value is constant, and it is sufficient
to study the case p ∈ [1/2, 1) by symmetry of the problem. Ho¨rner et al. (2010)
proved that if p ∈ [1/2, 2/3), then the value is vp =
p
4p−1
. If p ≥ 2/3, we do not
know the value except for p∗, the solution of 9p3 − 12p2 + 6p− 1 = 0, where one
has vp =
p∗
1−3p∗+6(p∗)2
.
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